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“Every pitifulest whipster that walks within a skin has had his head filled with the notion that he 
is, shall be, or by all human and divine laws ought to be, ‘happy’” (Thomas Carlyle). 
 
1. Issues 
Studying the causes and correlates of human happiness has become one of the hot topics in 
economics over the last decade, with both the size and depth of the literature increasing at an 
exponential rate (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006).2 To illustrate, a search of ECONLIT for 
journal articles with either ‘Happiness’, ‘Life Satisfaction’ or ‘Well-being’ in the title, identifies 
465 published articles between 1960 and 2006. Of these 363 (78%) have been published since 
1995, 285 (61%) have been published since 2000, and one-third of the literature (37%, or 173 
articles) has appeared in print in just the last three years.3 Focusing only on the period 2000-
2006, this measure of economists’ interest in the ‘economics’ or ‘science’ of happiness places 
that interest at roughly half the level of interest in ‘Wages’ and just below that in 
‘Discrimination’. However, happiness is quickly catching up: it is in its ‘industrial revolution’ 
stage. A search for Working Papers in SSRN or RePEc confirms the booming interest in the 
economics of happiness. While the vast majority of the studies in this literature are empirical, 
                                                 
1 Clark: PSE, Paris, France; Frijters: School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, 
Australia; Shields: Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Australia. We are grateful to the editor and 
anonymous referees for constructive comments. We also thank Colin Camerer, Richie Davidson, Ed Diener, Dick 
Easterlin, Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Felicia Huppert, Danny Kahneman, Brian Knutson, George Loewenstein, Dan 
Mroczek, Yew-Kwang Ng, Matthew Rablen, David Schkade, Wolfram Schultz, Arthur Stone, Stephen Wheatley 
Price, Peter Ubel and Dan Wilson for invaluable advice. Andrew Oswald and Bernard van Praag provided 
especially detailed suggestions. Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE) is a Joint Research Unit CNRS-
EHESS-ENPC-ENS. Frijters and Shields would thank to thank the Australian Research Council (ARC) for funding. 
2 Throughout this review we will use the terms (subjective) well-being (SWB), happiness and life satisfaction 
interchangeably. 
3 This covers articles published until April 2006. The search of ECONLIT was conducted on the 9th August, 2006. 
Only journal articles written in English were included in the search. There were also 149 papers identified by 
ECONLIT as being published since 1960 with ‘Job Satisfaction’ in the title, and 78 (52%) of these were published 
between 2000-2006. This growth in Economics in the use of various measures of well-being has been mirrored to a 
certain extent in other Social Sciences, for example the expansion of positive psychology 
(http://www.ppc.sas.upenn.edu/), and has spilled over into a number of ‘popular science’ reviews (Frey and Stutzer, 
2002b; Layard, 2005; and Nettle, 2005). 
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the theoretical foundations of the economics of happiness are also being expanded (see, for 
example, Rayo and Becker, 2004, and Graham and Oswald, 2006). 
The empirical cornerstone of this literature is the analysis of answers to current happiness or 
life satisfaction questions in cross-section and panel survey data. The responses to such 
questions are mostly on an ordinal scale (for example, ranging from 0 (Very Unhappy) to 10 
(Very Happy)). These responses are then taken as proxies for what economists call utility. If this 
is reasonable, the analysis of subjective well-being may be able to provide powerful additional 
insights into the factors motivating individual behaviour, and therefore the assumptions that 
underpin economic theory and policy design. The potential for new knowledge from this 
approach, especially in parallel with more traditional analysis, seems substantial. 
This potential has already been demonstrated in a number of domains. In the realm of 
macroeconomics, Di Tella et al. (2001, 2003) use cross-country happiness data from European 
countries to calculate the trade-off between inflation and unemployment; Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2005), in the same vein, conclude that there is no difference in this inflation-
unemployment trade-off between the rich and poor. Frijters et al. (2004a) show large life 
satisfaction gains in East Germany from increased real incomes in the decade following 
Reunification, while Frijters et al. (2006) calculate that the large swings in life satisfaction 
observed in post-transition Russia can be partially explained by variations in real incomes. 
Alesina et al. (2004) consider the demand for redistribution between the US and Europe via the 
effect of income inequality on individual well-being. Lastly, Kahneman and Krueger (2006) 
discuss the validity of subjective well-being questions and the use of real time measures of well-
being (experience sampling), and also promote the concept of national well-being indices to 
complement traditional National Income and Product Accounts.   
In microeconomic analysis, happiness data has been used to better establish the current 
psychological cost and longer-run scarring effects of unemployment (e.g. Clark and Oswald, 
1994; Clark et al., 2001; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). The normative use of subjective 
well-being is discussed in Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006), with particular reference to their 
work on political economy, and Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) provide a detailed 
account of how happiness data can be used to calculate the monetary equivalents of, amongst 
other things, climate change, chronic disease and noise pollution (also see Van Praag and 
Baarsma, 2005). Frey et al. (2006) take the same approach with respect to terrorism. Schwarze 
and Winkelmann (2005) show that happiness data can be fruitfully applied to the study of 
interdependent utility, such as the extent of altruism between parents and children; see also 
Kalugina et al. (2006). Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) relate the well-being of smokers to 
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cigarette taxes to conclude that smoking is at least partly a bad choice, from which smokers 
would prefer to be rescued (via higher tobacco taxes). 
The range of issues that have been addressed using subjective information is now wide. In 
terms of the causes of happiness, two topics have arguably attracted more interest than most: (1) 
the relationship between income and happiness; and (2) the relationship between labour market 
status (and especially unemployment) and happiness. While it is now widely accepted that 
unemployment reduces well-being, even after controlling for the associated fall in income, the 
relationship between income and happiness remains more contentious. It is this latter 
relationship which is the focus of this paper. 
 One of the catalysts in the literature on income and happiness was Easterlin’s seminal 
article (1974, updated in 1995), setting out the ‘paradox’ of substantial real income growth in 
Western countries over the last fifty years, but without any corresponding rise in reported 
happiness levels. Similar studies have also since been conducted by psychologists (Diener et al., 
1995) and political scientists (Inglehart, 1990). Figure 1 shows an Easterlin graph for the US 
over the period 1973-2004. While real income per capita almost doubles, happiness (from the 
General Social Survey) shows essentially no trend. From this figure, to borrow a term from 
health economics, it looks as if individuals in rich countries are ‘flat of the curve’, with 
additional income buying little if any extra happiness. It has been argued that once an individual 
rises above a poverty line or ‘subsistence level’, the main source of increased well-being is not 
income but rather friends and a good family life (see, for example, Lane, 2001). This 
‘subsistence level’ could be as low as US$10,000 per annum (as reported in Frey and Stutzer, 
2002a; and McMahon, 2006). Following on with this argument, the radical implication for 
developed countries at least is that economic growth per se is of little importance, and should 
therefore not be the primary goal of economic policy (Oswald, 1997). Layard (2005) goes as far 
as arguing that we need a ‘revolution’ in academia, where every social scientist should be 
attempting to understand the determinants of happiness, and it should be happiness which is the 
explicit aim of government intervention.4 
 
                                                 
4 It is interesting to note that this ‘modern’ viewpoint of the role of government in promoting happiness contrasts 
sharply with that of the ancient Greeks and much of the world of antiquity (see McMahon, 2006, for a history of the 
philosophy of happiness). Angner (2005) provides a fascinating account of the modern history of Subjective Well-
Being. 
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FIGURE 1: Happiness and Real Income Per Capita in the US, 1973-20045 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1998 2003
Year
A
ve
ra
ge
 H
ap
pi
ne
ss
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
R
ea
l I
nc
om
e 
Pe
r C
ap
ita
 (C
on
st
an
t 2
00
0 
U
S$
)
Happiness Real Income Per Capita
 
FIGURE 2: Life Satisfaction in Five European Countries, 1973-20046 
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5 Source: World Database of Happiness and Penn World Tables. Average reply to the following question: ‘Taken 
all together, how would you say things are these days? Would you say that you are…?’ Responses are coded as (3) 
Very Happy, (2) Pretty Happy, and (1) Not too Happy. Happiness data are drawn from the General Social Survey. 
6 Source: World Database of Happiness. Average responses to the following question: ‘On the whole how satisfied 
are you with the life you lead’. Responses are coded as (4) Very Satisfied, (3) Fairly Satisfied, (2) Not Very 
Satisfied, and (1) Not at all Satisfied. Life satisfaction data are drawn from the Eurobarometer Survey. 
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This ‘paradox’ is not specifically a US phenomenon. The same picture can be drawn for 
Japan (Easterlin, 1995), which has seen one of the largest increases in real per capita income of 
any country since World War II, and also for Europe. Figure 2 shows trends in average life 
satisfaction for five European countries since 1973. As in the US, there has been no obvious 
increase in life satisfaction over a thirty-year period, even though real incomes per capita have 
increased sharply in all five countries. The only trend is found in Italy, the poorest country of the 
five, where average life satisfaction increased from 2.67 in 1973 to 2.88 in 2004, a rise of 9.3%. 
Easterlin (2005a) provides a useful summary of this macro empirical literature.  
The same time-series data in transitional countries, however, suggest a larger role for 
income. Consider Figure 3, which shows average life satisfaction and real income in East 
Germany during the decade following reunification. East Germans experienced a substantial 
increase in real income between 1991 and 2002, and reported a considerable rise in their life 
satisfaction over the same period. 
  
FIGURE 3: Life Satisfaction and Income in East Germany, 1991-20027 
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 However, we should be cautious in concluding from these graphs, which illustrate bivariate 
correlations, that income does not buy happiness in the developed world. A parallel body of 
                                                 
7 Source: Frijters et al. (2004a). Data are drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP). 
Respondents are asked: ‘How satisfied are you at present with your life, all things considered?’ The responses run 
from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). 
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work has produced what is now a large body of evidence suggesting that money does matter. 
There are three stylised facts in this second literature. 
 
1) A regression of happiness on income in cross-section survey data from one country (with or 
without standard demographic controls) generally produces a significant positive estimated 
coefficient on income. This holds for both developed (see, for example, Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2004; Shields and Wheatley Price, 2005) and developing (Graham and Pettinato, 2002; 
Lelkes, 2006) countries. However, the income-happiness slope is larger in developing or 
transition than in developed economies. 
 
2) Recent work has used panel data to control for unobserved individual fixed effects, such as 
personality traits, and concludes that changes in real incomes are correlated with changes in 
happiness (see, for example, Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001; 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Senik, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Clark et al., 2005). 
Further, a number of these studies have been able to utilise exogenous variations in income to 
more firmly establish the causal effect of income on happiness (e.g. Gardner and Oswald, 
2006b; Frijters et al., 2004a, 2004b, 2006). It is again the case that income has a larger effect in 
transition than in developed countries. In addition, the slope of the income-happiness 
relationship is not necessarily the same between groups (Clark et al., 2005; Frijters et al., 2004a; 
Lelkes, 2006). 
 
3) Recent detailed studies of the ‘macroeconomics of happiness’ using very large samples and 
cross-time cross-country models that control for country fixed-effects, have shown that 
happiness co-moves with macroeconomic variables including GDP, GDP growth and inflation 
(see, for example, Di Tella et al., 2003; Helliwell, 2003; Alesina et al., 2004). A useful set of 
recent figures is to be found in Leigh and Wolfers (2006). 
 
The bulk of the evidence in 1) – 3) thus suggests that income does raise happiness. This is 
likely one reason why economists’ interest in happiness has been growing: happiness functions 
look like utility functions.  
One of the main challenges for the economics of happiness is therefore to render the 
significant income coefficient found in much of empirical literature consistent with the time 
profiles shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3, and to identify the ensuing implications of the fundamental 
income-happiness relationship for both economic theory and policy design.  
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This paper attempts to respond to that challenge. Our answer is based on the concept of 
income comparisons – both to others in the relevant reference group (social comparisons) and to 
oneself in the past (adaptation or habituation). We provide a unified account of the observed 
income-happiness gradients in both the micro and macro literature by presenting them as 
straightforward extensions of the textbook utility function.  
The recent growth of the empirical literature on income and happiness has produced much 
information with respect to income comparisons. We summarise these new findings, especially 
focusing on studies that have used panel data from surveys such as the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) and the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). These panel studies allow researchers to track 
individuals’ income and happiness over long periods (now over 20 years in the case of the 
GSOEP) and to control for individual fixed traits, the latter having been shown to be crucial 
components in the modelling of subjective well-being (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). 
We then highlight some of the main implications of income comparisons for a range of 
issues relating to economic theory and policy design. The economic issues we focus on include 
many of the central concerns of economics: consumption, investment, economic growth, 
savings, taxation, labour supply, wages and migration. 
This recent growth of interest by economists in happiness might to some extent obscure the 
fact that psychologists have been putting serious effort into the analysis of various well-being 
measures for at least the past forty years. Recent reviews of this literature include Diener and 
Biswas-Diener (2002), Diener et al. (1999), Elster and Roemer (1993), Huppert et al. (2005) and 
Kahneman et al. (1999). It is clear from this body of work that economists can learn a great deal 
from psychologists about the factors that make people happy. Perhaps the most salient lessons 
from this psychological literature are that: (i) individuals appear to adapt to a considerable extent 
to changes in their circumstances, although the evidence on income adaptation is very limited; 
(ii) people are concerned about their relative standing (e.g. income, status)8 and not just about 
their absolute position in society; (iii) individuals have aspirations about their future, and 
subjective well-being is substantially lower if these expectations are not met; and (iv) a large 
amount (somewhere between 50% and 80%; see Lykken and Tellegen, 1996) of the variation in 
individuals’ reported well-being might be explained by genetics or personality traits. Currently 
manipulating such genetic traits is well outside the current remit of public policy, so that only up 
to one-half of human happiness can potentially be changed. However, to the extent that 
                                                 
8 Of course, economists have also known this for many years (see, for example, Layard, 1980; Frank, 1985). 
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personality traits are developed in early childhood, and reflect ‘nurture’ rather than ‘nature’, this 
malleable percentage is potentially far higher. 
This leads to the following question: ‘Given that psychologists have been working on this 
most important of human issues9, why has it taken economists so much longer to enter the 
field?’ One commonly-cited reason is that happiness is hard to measure directly, and economists 
have expressed doubts about attempts to do so (see, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2001). This view concords with the traditional ‘indirect’ economic method of measuring 
happiness via revealed preferences, where individuals are assumed to make utility-maximising 
decisions given their constraints. In this case, the observation of individual behaviour allows 
preferences to be identified, obviating the need for direct measurement of utility. Our position is 
that the analysis of subjective measures provides a useful complement to the traditional analysis 
of objective behaviours. 
The potential criticisms raised against the use of subjective happiness data include the 
following. First, does a question asking about current happiness on some ordinal scale really 
provide a good assessment of current circumstances (relating to, for example, family life, job 
and income), or will the response also pick up ephemeral factors like having a cold or toothache, 
the weather, their sports team’s recent results, or having recently watched a hard-hitting 
documentary about Third-World famine? Second, can we compare the responses of different 
people to questions like ‘All things considered, how happy are you with your life?’, to conclude 
that individual A is happier than individual B? Or even that individual A is happier today than 
she was a month ago? That is, can we carry out interpersonal or intertemporal comparisons in 
happiness scores? 
Fortunately, psychologists and other scientists have been examining these issues for many 
years, and the broad consensus is that subjective well-being data contains a great deal of ‘valid 
variability’ (Diener, 1984; also see the discussion in Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). This is the 
subject of the next section.  
 
2. Validity: How Well do Happiness Scores Measure Utility? 
There is now a wide body of evidence supporting the hypothesis that subjective well-being 
measures contain valid information on what economists call utility. Some of the main validation 
approaches are presented below.  
                                                 
9 It is often argued that happiness is the ultimate goal of life. Such a goal, for example, is explicit in the United 
States Declaration of Independence. This Declaration “takes is as a self-evident truth that the pursuit of happiness is 
an unalienable right, comparable to life and liberty”. However, such a goal has not always been evident (see 
McMahon, 2006). Along the same lines, Health is defined in the World Health Organisation's Constitution as a 
“state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”. 
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 2.1 Cross-Rater Validity  
It is presumed that asking A how happy she is will provide information about her unobserved 
real level of happiness. A simple validity check is then to ask B whether he thinks A is happy. 
Many studies have shown that individuals are able to a large extent to recognise and predict the 
satisfaction level of others. In interviews in which respondents are shown pictures or videos of 
others, they accurately identify whether the individual shown to them was happy, sad, jealous, 
and so on (see Sandvik et al., 1993; and Diener and Lucas, 1999). This is also the case when 
respondents were shown individuals from other cultures.10 It might then be argued that there is a 
common human language of satisfaction or happiness, so that subjective well-being is at least to 
an extent observable and comparable between individuals. It has also been found that 
individuals in the same language community have a common understanding of how to translate 
internal feelings into a number scale, simply in order to be able to communicate with each other. 
Respondents translate verbal labels, such as 'very good' and 'very bad', into roughly the same 
numerical values (see Van Praag 1991).11 A tempting conclusion is that an evolutionary 
advantage accrues to the accurate evaluation of how well others are doing.12 
The general idea of having a third party evaluate respondents’ happiness has been used to 
validate the replies that individuals themselves provide (see Sandvik et al., 1993; Diener and 
Lucas, 1999). When friends and family are asked about how happy they believe the respondent 
is, the scores they provide tend to correlate with the respondent’s own report.13 Another obvious 
choice is the interviewer: again, the answer the interviewer gives tallies with that of the 
respondent. Lastly, respondents are sometimes given open-ended interviews in conjunction with 
standard questions about their well-being. When third parties, who do not know the respondent, 
are played these open-ended interviews their evaluation of the respondent’s well-being matches 
well with the respondent’s own reply. 
                                                 
10 This is reminiscent of work in the area of ‘emotion’ undertaken in the 1960s (see the description in Chapter 1 of 
Nettle, 2005). American respondents were very good at identifying the emotions depicted by American actors in a 
series of photographs; but importantly so were the Dani tribespeople of Papua New Guinea. 
11 More precisely, it looks as if individuals convert the verbal labels into cardinal numbers that equally divide up the 
response space. Practically, this is one reason why ordinal and cardinal estimation techniques applied to subjective 
measures of well-being or health most often produce similar results (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). 
12 Seabright (2004, Chapter 3) invokes the possibility that smiling and laughter may have evolved as (accurate) 
signals of trustworthiness. It is not easy to fake smiles, and extremely difficult to fake laughter. 
13 This test is not as clean as it might appear at first sight, for the reasons underlined in Manski (1993). Third parties 
and respondents may share unobserved characteristics which lead them to supply similar answers, even though the 
correlation between the two underlying constructs (how happy the individual thinks she is, and how happy her 
friend thinks she is) may be only small. This applies particularly to third-party reports from both friends and family 
who likely share with the respondent idiosyncratic uses of language. This is less of a problem with third-party raters 
who are unknown to the respondent. The correlation is not affected if both A and B use the same linear 
transformation of their real evaluation into a report, but it will be exaggerated if part of both A’s and B’s answer 
reflects a norm belief that people “should” score 8 out of 10 on subjective well-being scales. 
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 2.2 Physiological and Neurological Evidence  
Instead of relying on others’ judgements, individuals’ well-being scores can be examined in 
relation to various physiological and neurological phenomena. It is known (see Shizgal, 1999; 
Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda, 1995; Sandvik et al., 1993) that there is a strong positive 
correlation between emotional expressions like smiling, and frowning, and answers to well-
being questions. Ito and Cacioppo (1999) showed that positive and negative emotions are 
associated with the extent of the startle response, and various measures of facial expressions 
(facial electromyography).  
A recent literature has looked at the relationships between positive and negative states, on 
the one hand, and neurological measures, on the other. Obtaining physical measures of brain 
activity is an important step in showing that individuals’ self-reports reflect real phenomena.14 
Particular interest has been shown in prefrontal brain asymmetry.15 In right-handed people, 
positive feelings are generally associated with more alpha power in the left prefrontal cortex (the 
dominant brain wave activity of awake adults are called alpha waves), and negative feelings 
with more alpha power in the right prefrontal cortex.16 This relationship was initially suggested 
by the observations of patients with unilateral cortical damage (see Davidson, 2004), but more 
recently has been explored using techniques to measure localised brain activity, such as 
electrodes on the scalp in Electro-encephalography (EEG) or scanners in Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI). 
A recent example is Urry et al. (2004). In this study 84 right-handed individuals (drawn 
from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study) provide answers to questions on positive and negative 
affect, measures of hedonic well-being using global life satisfaction scores, and measures of 
eudaimonic well-being, which are designed to capture elements such as mastery, relations with 
others, self-acceptance and purpose. Brain activity is measured via EEG. Left-right brain 
asymmetry is shown to be associated with higher levels of positive affect, and with both hedonic 
and eudaimonic well-being. Interestingly, the correlation between brain asymmetry and positive 
affect explains all of the correlation with hedonic well-being, but only some of the correlation 
with eudaimonic well-being; in other words, left-right asymmetry is not just about pleasurable 
                                                 
14 Davidson (2004) notes that ‘The identification of the brain circuitry responsible for different aspects of affective 
processing has helped to parse the domain of emotion into more elementary constituents in a manner similar to that 
found in cognitive neuroscience, where an appeal to the brain has facilitated the rapid development of theory and 
data on the subcomponents of various cognitive processes’ (p.1395). 
15 Other approaches have also been explored. Knutson et al. (2001) explore the relationship between positive 
emotions and activity in subcortical circuits including the nucleus accumbens. 
16 This is an oversimplification, and recent work has cast the left-right opposition in terms of approach versus 
withdrawal (anger, a negative approach-related emotion, is associated with more alpha power in the left prefrontal 
cortex): see Urry et al. (2004). 
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feelings. Davidson (2004) describes further work in which left-right asymmetry is associated 
with quicker recovery from negative affect challenge (i.e. “shocks” to happiness), over and 
above its effect on baseline well-being. 
Brain asymmetry is also associated with physiological measures, such as cortisol and 
corticotropin releasing hormone (CRH), which are involved in response to stress, and with 
antibody production in response to influenza vaccine (Davidson, 2004). In general, it seems that 
brain asymmetry is not only associated with measures of subjective well-being, but general 
measures of wellness of the organism’s functioning.17  
Given the general positive outcomes associated with brain asymmetry, it is important to 
know how the latter comes about. It seems likely that there is a role for genetics, with recent 
work showing that the form of a certain gene involved in regulating the serotonin system 
(5HTT) is a predictor of neuroticism, which is related to left-right asymmetry (see Nettle, 2005). 
However, the degree of asymmetry is far from being a fatality. Huppert (2006) underlines the 
plasticity of the brain in the young, and Davidson (2004) describes the role of early social 
experiences in determining some aspects of brain circuitry. In adults, it is possible to manipulate 
this left-right balance by showing respondents pleasant or unpleasant pictures or films, and also 
by using magnetic fields to stimulate activity in the left frontal portion of the brain. Davidson 
(2004, p.1407) also mentions some intriguing results from a controlled experiment in which 
those randomly assigned to a meditation group (compared to a neutral control) showed an 
increase in left-right brain activation; remarkably the meditation group also showed an increase 
in antibody production in response to influenza vaccine relative to the control group. Although 
the long-run duration of these effects is not known, it is clear that “the wiring in our brains is not 
static, nor irrevocably fixed” (Davidson, 2004). 
 
2.3 Test-Retest Correlation  
Whereas the other approaches mentioned here concern validity (i.e. is the measure correlated 
with the underlying construct of interest?), test-retest correlations are used to evaluate 
instrument reliability (i.e. do you obtain the same outcome when you repeatedly apply the 
measure?). The reliability of a measure is defined by Larsen and Fredricksen (1999) as the 
degree to which measures reflect the ‘true’ amount of the construct. As this latter aspect is 
unobservable in many domains, they note that “For certain psychological constructs, a test-retest 
correlation is a good estimate of reliability” (p.42). This does suppose, however, that the 
                                                 
17 A recent review article by Pressman and Cohen (2005) describes the relationships between affective “style” and 
physical health; see also Steptoe et al. (2005). 
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underlying construct is stable over time (so that any differences found will be between 
individuals), and it is arguable to what extent well-being measures fall into this category. Test-
retest correlations of happiness are high when the measures are taken fairly close together, partly 
because the personality element (the fixed effect) does not change but also because many 
individuals’ lives change little from one month to the next. It is worth noting that when changes 
do occur (such as marriage, divorce, unemployment, birth of first child and so on), there are 
sizeable movements, in the expected direction, in subjective well-being. 
 
2.4 Predicting Outcomes  
Perhaps the evidence that is most persuasive to economists is that respondents seem to act on 
what they say i.e. they behave as if they were maximising their subjective well-being. Many 
panel data studies have found that subjective well-being at time t predicts future behaviour, in 
that individuals clearly choose to discontinue activities associated with low levels of well-being 
(see Kahneman et al., 1993; Frijters, 2000; and Shiv and Huber, 2000). A number of labour 
market studies have shown that job satisfaction is a strong predictor of job quits, even when 
controlling for wages, hours of work and other standard individual and job variables (see, for 
example, Freeman, 1978; Clark et al., 1998; Clark, 2001; Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen, 
2006). A recent example using data on the self-employed is found in Georgellis et al. (2005). 
Clark (2003) shows that mental stress scores on entering unemployment predict unemployment 
duration: those who suffered the sharpest drop in well-being upon entering unemployment were 
the quickest to leave it. 
The medical literature has also found high correlations in the expected sense between low 
well-being scores and coronary heart disease (Sales and House, 1971), strokes (Huppert, 2006), 
suicide (Koivumaa-Honkanen et al., 2001) and length of life (Palmore, 1969; and Mroczek and 
Spiro, 2006). Individuals with higher life satisfaction scores were less likely to catch a cold 
when exposed to a cold virus, and recovered faster if they did (Cohen et al., 2003). Lastly, 
measures of life satisfaction have also recently been shown to predict future marital break-up 
(Gardner and Oswald, 2006a).18  
Overall, the growing economics of happiness literature is testament to the fact that a 
growing number of economists believe that self-reported well-being data contain valuable 
information that can complement our understanding of individual behaviour. In terms of the 
specific subject of this review, happiness data are the cornerstone of the Easterlin paradox; the 
                                                 
18 A final point worth making is that when asked to report their level of happiness, life satisfaction or well-being in 
surveys, only a small minority of respondents do not provide an answer (less than 1% of respondents in the BHPS 
or GSOEP). The concept of happiness is intuitively understood by almost everyone. 
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following section asks whether the same data can be used to resolve this paradox, by 
demonstrating the importance of social comparisons and adaptation. 
 
3. Income and Happiness: Evidence and Explanations 
Here we focus on the main explanations that have been proposed to reconcile the Easterlin 
Paradox, as illustrated in Figures 1-3, and the stylised facts that have emerged from the 
empirical literature showing a significant positive relationship between income (changes) and 
happiness (changes) at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. These explanations 
mainly appeal to the existence of relative terms in the individual utility function. These 
comparisons may concern others, or oneself in the past, evoking the possibility that individuals 
adapt or ‘get used to’ their changing income (Easterlin, 2001). After showing how both types of 
comparison can be presented as simple extensions to the standard economics textbook utility 
function, we discuss recent work that has shed new light on the degree to which individuals do 
compare themselves to others (or to themselves in the past or the future). We conclude by 
highlighting a number of other candidate explanations for the Paradox, which emphasise some 
of the empirical difficulties facing researchers in this field of study. 
 Consider a utility function of the form: 
 
           (1) *1 2 3 1( ( ),  ( | ),  u ( , ))t t t t tU U u Y u Y Y T l Z= t−
t
 
where  is a common function over all individuals indicating how the subutilities 
 are combined into final utility ; the subscript t refers to time. Here  is (a 
monotonic transformation of) utility for which reported happiness or life satisfaction is taken to 
be a useful empirical proxy. We will most often interpret  as individual happiness or life 
satisfaction, both in terms of experienced and decision utility (Kahneman et al., 1997), but in 
some specific instances we will use it to measure the aggregate happiness of all individuals in a 
given geographical area. In this specification,  is the vector of incomes  from t=0 to t and 
 can be thought of as the classic function showing utility from consumption, which is 
increasing at a decreasing rate in its argument. As we are thinking of a vector of incomes in 
general, past incomes may affect current consumption, for example via wealth. In a one-period 
model, or in a model without savings, income will equal consumption , so that 
. 
(.)U
1 2 3,  ,  and u u u (.)U tU
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 The subutility function  picks up the influence of leisure, , with  
denoting hours at work, and a vector of other socio-economic and demographic variables, 
3( ,t tu T l Z− 1 ) ( )tT l− tl
1tZ . 
While the first and third parts of the utility function in (1) are standard, the second is less so, 
and shows the influence of status or habituation. The economic analysis of such relative income 
effects (or more generally, interdependent preferences) can be dated back to at least Veblen 
(1899), and then Duesenberry (1949). More recent contributions include Pollak (1976), Frank 
(1985) and Elster and Roemer (1991)  
The variable  is often called ‘reference group’ or ‘comparison’ income, and the ratio of 
yt/y*t is called relative income. Any empirical test will require that we know how each 
individual’s reference group is determined. In this respect, we can distinguish between internal 
reference points, such as own past income or expected future income, and external reference 
points, where comparisons refer to distinct demographic groups such as own family, other 
workers at their place of employment, people in the same neighbourhood, region, country, or 
even people across a whole set of countries. With external reference points,  can be 
interpreted as the 'status return' from income, or the positional or conspicuous consumption 
aspect of income. This status function is assumed to increase at a decreasing rate in , but 
decrease at an increasing rate in . The status function is homogeneous of degree zero, so that 
: status is unaffected by proportional increases in income and reference 
income. In many cases, 
*
tY
*
2( | )t tu Y Y
tY
*
tY
*
2 2( | ) ( |t t t tu aY aY u Y Y= *)
*
2( | ) /t t tu Y Y c c= t , where tc  is average reference group consumption, but 
the formulation is sufficiently general to encompass the bulk of the specifications used in the 
literature. 
 The empirical literature on income and happiness has in the main estimated simple forms of 
(1), such as: 
 
     * '1 2ln( ) ln( / )t t t tU y y y tZβ β= + + γ            (2) 
 
where  is most often a measure of real individual or household income,  is some specific 
reference income, and Z includes both demographics Z1 and hours of work. The correspondence 
between a function such as (2) and direct utility functions which depend on consumption is 
assured if there is no saving. 
ty
*
ty
Reference group income  has been defined in a number of different ways. The simplest 
approach is to calculate average income in the geographical area (the village, neighbourhood, 
*
ty
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region or country) where the survey respondent lives (see, for example, Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2004; Frijters et al., 2006; Luttmer, 2005). Another method is to use regression analysis 
to predict the income of ‘someone like me’, where the regression controls for individual 
characteristics such as age, sex, education and region (examples include Clark and Oswald, 
1996; McBride, 2001; and Senik, 2004). Alternatively, the income of family members, friends 
or colleagues can be used to measure . *ty
The above reference groups can be thought of as external. A parallel literature has examined 
internal reference points, specifically the individual’s own past income or income aspirations for 
the future (see, for example, McBride, 2001; Knight and Song, 2006; Stutzer, 2004). Kimball 
and Willis (2006) provide a fuller review of work on the psychology of adaptation and reference 
points. In the next two sub-sections, we consider external reference groups, before turning to 
adaptation and aspirations. 
 
3.1 Social Comparisons 
To illustrate the main forces at work when individuals compare to others, consider the following 
stylised implication of the relationship between income and happiness across countries when: i) 
income is the only systematic difference between countries (so that we can relegate u3 in 
equation (1) to a constant and ignore it); and ii) reference income is average income within the 
country. This case is depicted in Figure 4, for the function: 1 2 ln( / )ii i
i
yU y
y A
β β= ++ iy , with 
iy  being average income in the country where individual i lives, and A being a positive constant. 
The functional form here is deliberately chosen to ensure that the benefit of an across-the-board 
proportional rise in income tends to zero as income goes to infinity: a general rise in income 
leaves the second term unchanged, and produces a change in the first term which tends to zero 
as income increases. Note that this is not true of the formulation in (2) where a growth in log-
income by x will increase utility by x 1β  for any level of income. 
The main prediction of this model is that the gradient between income and happiness is 
steeper within a country at a point in time, than over time by country. This is because of the 
status benefit of high income within a country. Crucially, however, this status benefit has no 
aggregate impact on country-level happiness (in this model, the more status one person has, the 
less others have: status is a zero-sum game). Over time in a given country, the only effect of 
income on aggregate happiness will be via the consumption component of the utility function 
(u1). 
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FIGURE 4: The Relationship between Income and Happiness at the Individual and the 
Aggregate Level 
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This Figure is easiest to interpret if we imagine that, over time, individuals in a particular 
country move from the left ellipses to the right ellipses. At  the population in this country is 
poor and the slope between individual income and individual happiness (which is shown by the 
dotted line) is relatively steep. At  the population has become somewhat richer, and the 
relationship between individual income and individual happiness is less steep than at . In the 
third period, , average income is high and the slope between individual income and individual 
happiness is fairly flat. It is clear that in all three periods the status return from income yields a 
relationship between individual
0t
1t
0t
2t
 income and individual happiness (the dotted line) which is 
steeper than the relationship between aggregate income and aggregate happiness (as shown by 
the thick line). In the last period, where individuals are relatively rich, there is almost no 
aggregate benefit at the country level to higher income, but there is still a substantial individual 
status return to earning more.  
This stylised illustration sums up a pervasive opinion over the last few decades about the 
relationship between income and happiness at the individual country level. The marginal utility 
from extra consumption approaches zero as countries become richer (in equation (2), this 
marginal utility equals β1/y; in the specification we use for Figure 4, it is β1A/(yi+A)2). On the 
contrary, the marginal utility of extra status never approaches zero, because in general y* 
(reference group income) rises in line with own income, y. This model thus explains the 
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Easterlin (1974) paradox and concurs with much of the psychological and some of the economic 
literature. At a point in time, those with higher incomes enjoy higher consumption and higher 
status (and are thus happier); over time, as everyone becomes richer, as the amount of status is 
fixed the only benefit to the country is from higher consumption, the value of which drops 
towards zero.  
This simple model can be embellished by considering the relationship between income and 
happiness across several countries simultaneously, as in Di Tella et al. (2003). Here the authors 
estimate individual happiness equations over 12 countries and 18 years, controlling for not only 
individual demographic variables, but also country fixed effects, time dummies, and 
macroeconomic variables such as lagged GDP. They find, as Kapteyn et al. (1976) had 
previously argued, that `social reference spaces' (reference groups) can include whole countries, 
and that happiness within a country is strongly positively correlated with GDP growth over the 
last year. This can be squared with the general observation that, over long periods of time, GDP 
and happiness are uncorrelated in richer countries by an expanded happiness function with two 
different kinds of comparison: 
 
    * * *1 2 3ln( ) ln( / ) ln( / )ijt ijt ijt jt jt t ijtU y y y y y
'Zβ β β= + + + γ
*
*
     (3) 
 
Here  is the happiness of an individual i in country j at time t,  is average income in 
country j at time t; and  is average income over the whole set of countries (say Europe) at 
time t. This happiness function is of the same nature as that appealed to in (2) to describe 
happiness within a country, but with an added component  reflecting the income 
of one country relative to that in a set of other countries. This added component shows 
individuals’ utility gain from living in a relatively successful country. 
ijtU
*
jty
*
ty
* *
3( ln( / ))jt ty yβ
If income in all countries grows at the same pace, then  will remain unchanged. In 
this case, the discussion applied to Figure 4 is valid for each country, although individual 
countries at a point in time may be on different portions of the unbroken line, depending on their 
income level. However, if one country’s GDP grows relative to that of its neighbours, then 
 will change, and the high-growth country will enjoy greater happiness. The best outcome 
for each country is to have high income while its neighbours have low incomes. However, 
unless one country can increasingly outstrip its neighbours, the additional benefit of more 
* /jt ty y
* /jt ty y
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income is subject to decreasing returns.19 This type of happiness function can help explain why 
countries are locked in an arms race over growth, even though, on aggregate, that growth will 
only bring utility via the consumption function. In each country the component  
produces a strong relationship between GDP and happiness. However, analogously to the 
individual argument within a country, the happiness return from being richer than other 
countries is, from the world perspective, a zero-sum game. 
* *
3 ln( / )jt ty yβ
Status-races can lead to sub-optimal outcomes if they crowd out non-status activities. This 
can be illustrated using the general utility function (1), where a higher income for individual i 
reduces the utility of everyone whose reference group includes i. In the specification proposed, 
higher income comes about at the expense of leisure time. Consider the parameterisation 
 
    1 2ln( ) ln( / ) ln( / )it it it t it tU y y y T y wβ β γ= + + −        (4) 
 
where the main difference from the utility function in the previous examples is the expression 
ln( / )it tT y wγ − , reflecting the utility from leisure (where leisure is T minus the number of hours 
spent earning income  at wage ). Figure 5 illustrates the individual’s utility-maximising 
choice of income relative to that pertaining in the social optimum (where status externalities are 
internalised). 
ity tw
  
Figure 5: The Marginal Happiness of Additional Income for an Individual versus a Country 
 
                                                 
19 Note that if the ‘true’ happiness function does indeed depend (negatively) on some measure of reference group 
income, but we instead estimate a happiness equation that does not include y*, then the negative effect of higher 
levels of y* over time will show up as a negative time-trend (as in Di Tella et al., 2003). 
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In this figure, the top curve shows it
it
dU
dy
, the marginal utility to the individual of additional 
labour income. This marginal utility is positive up to income Y2, at which point the detrimental 
effect to the individual of less leisure is exactly balanced by the increased consumption and 
higher status that come with more income. The lower curve in this figure represents 
| t it t ity y y yit it
it t
U U
y y
=∂ ∂+∂ ∂ |
= , which is the effect of additional income in the country when everyone’s 
income increases at the same time (i.e. when all individuals make the same choice). This 
effectively removes the status benefit of higher income. The second curve lies below the first 
due to the negative externality of  in the term ty 2 ln( / )it ty yβ . Individuals choose income of Y2, 
where their marginal utility of income is zero, whereas the societal optimum, taking externalities 
into account, is at the lower income of Y1. It is tempting to relate Figure 5 to the literature on 
excessive work hours (see Schor, 1992).  
The above illustrations considered, for simplicity, reference groups defined at the country or 
supra-country level, but the same argument holds when reference groups are defined at a finer 
level. The empirical literature has typically appealed to more disaggregated reference groups. 
This is partly for intuitive reasons of social distance (people living in London are more likely to 
compare themselves to other Londoners than to people living in Glasgow or Cardiff; people 
compare more within their age cohort than outside of it), and partly to obtain sufficient variation 
in comparison income, , to allow for a tight estimate of its coefficient. *ty
 
3.2 Evidence of Social Comparisons 
A rapidly growing number of econometric studies use survey data on happiness or life 
satisfaction to evaluate the importance of ‘absolute’ versus ‘relative’ income. This corresponds 
to estimating the relative size of the coefficients β1 and β2 in (2). Here we first concentrate on the 
contributions from the econometric estimation of subjective well-being including reference 
group income as an explanatory variable, before turning to a variety of other approaches that 
have revealed evidence consistent with a concern for status in the utility function. 
Empirical tests of social comparisons over income require candidate measures of . One 
such candidate is the income of “people like me” (i.e. those with the same age, education etc., 
who are doing the same kind of job). This reference group income can be calculated in two 
different ways. We can either estimate wage equations and then calculate the predicted income 
for each individual, as in Clark and Oswald (1996), or, perhaps more simply, we can compute 
*
ty
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cell averages (for example, average wage by region, sex and education). This latter calculation 
can either be carried out within the dataset, or matched in from an external source.  
A crucial issue in the econometric literature is that of identification:  is typically estimated 
as a linear function of some explanatory variables X1 in the wage equation approach. To then 
identify the effect of  on happiness, we need either exclusion restrictions (some variables 
which appear in X1 but which do not enter the happiness equation), or identification directly 
from the functional form (such as when the prediction of  enters in a different functional form 
in the happiness regression to the variables in X1). The cell average approach relies on more 
hidden exclusion restrictions in that it relies on the assumption that individuals compare 
themselves only to average incomes in the same cell and that other incomes do not enter at all. 
*
ty
*
ty
*
ty
The empirical literature mostly started by considering job satisfaction, reflecting economists’ 
interest in wages and the labour market, and perhaps also the original research carried out in 
industrial psychology, before moving on to global measures of well-being such as happiness and 
life satisfaction.  
Probably the first economist to estimate subjective well-being equations using both y and  
was Dan Hamermesh (1977). Although Hamermesh's focus is upon occupational choice and the 
effects of training in American data, and he does not discuss relative income in detail, his job 
satisfaction regressions include the residual from a wage equation as an explanatory variable. 
This residual, y-  in our terminology, has a positive and significant effect on job satisfaction.  
*
ty
*
ty
The regression approach of calculating the income of “people like me” was also used by 
Clark and Oswald (1996) on the first wave of British Household Panel Study (BHPS) data. The 
estimated coefficients on income and comparison income in a job satisfaction equation are 
statistically equal and opposite, which is consistent with a fully relative utility function: to 
paraphrase Easterlin (1995), in these results increasing the income of all increases the happiness 
of no-one. Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2004), and Sloane and Williams (2000), using 
Canadian and British data respectively, have also found evidence that econometrically-predicted 
comparison income is negatively correlated with job satisfaction.  
Articles which calculate comparison income as a cell average, rather than an econometric 
prediction from individual data, include Cappelli and Sherer (1988) who find that pay 
satisfaction is negatively correlated with an outside "market wage", calculated by averaging pay 
for specific occupations in other firms (airlines, in this case). Clark and Oswald (1996) find a 
negative relationship between job satisfaction in BHPS data and average earnings by hours of 
work matched in from the UK Labour Force Survey.  
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Stepping outside of the realm of work, a number of recent papers have found comparison 
income effects using cell means. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) calculates comparison income as an 
average within fifty cells defined by sex, age and education in six years of German GSOEP data; 
McBride (2001) uses 1994 data from the General Social Survey, and defines comparison income 
as average earnings of the individual’s cohort, defined as those who are between 5 years 
younger and 5 years older than her. Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) use GSS data over the 
period 1972-1998, with  defined as average income by State. Luttmer (2005) also takes a 
geographic approach to reference groups, and calculates average income by local area identified 
in a number of waves of the US National Survey of Families and Households; this is shown to 
be negatively correlated with respondents’ life satisfaction, conditional on their own income. 
Helliwell and Huang (2005) is in the same vein, calculating average household income by 
census tract in Canadian GSS data. The estimated coefficient on this variable in life satisfaction 
equations is negative, and equal in size to the positive coefficient on household income, 
suggesting that life satisfaction is totally relative in income. As the estimated coefficient on 
income refers to β1+β2 in equation (2), and that on relative income to –β2, the finding that the 
coefficients are equal and opposite is tantamount to saying that the consumption benefit of 
higher income (β1) is essentially zero, which is consistent with Figures 1 to 3. 
*
ty
A novel paper dealing with social comparisons is Knight and Song (2006). This paper 
appeals to cross-sectional information on 9,200 households in China, and thus refers to an 
economy which is very different from the Europe-North America nexus which has so far 
dominated the literature. The authors are not only able to identify the villages their respondents 
came from, but also confirm that 70% of individuals indeed see their village as their reference 
group (by simply asking them to whom they compare themselves), making their rural sample 
well-suited to the question of how important reference groups really are. Controlling for own 
income, and for village income, those respondents who say that their income was much above 
the village average report far higher happiness than those who say that their income was much 
below the village average. The difference between the two estimated coefficients implies a 
happiness boost of one point, on a zero to four scale, making relative income the most important 
right-hand side variable. 
The above work considers  as the income of “people like me” or those living in the same 
neighbourhood. Another potential peer group is those with whom the individual comes into 
close daily contact: her family, friends and work colleagues. With respect to the latter, and 
despite the current abundance of microeconomic data, very few papers have related individual 
well-being to co-workers’ wages. Indirect evidence has shown that observable behaviour (quits) 
*
ty
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depends on own wage relative to colleagues’ wages (Galizzi and Lang, 1998). One direct test is 
Brown et al. (2006), who use matched employer-employee data from the British Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey (WERS). Individuals were asked to report their satisfaction with the 
amount of influence they have, their pay, their achievement, and the respect they receive. 
Controlling for own wage, the (normalised) rank of the individual in the firm wage distribution 
is correlated positively and significantly with all four measures of satisfaction (see their Table 
6b). 
The situation is equally sparse with respect to family and friends. Clark (1996) uses BHPS 
data to relate individual job satisfaction to the wages of their partners, and the average wage of 
other household members, conditional on their own wage. The results show that individuals do 
indeed report lower job satisfaction scores the higher are the wages of other workers in the 
household. McBride (2001) also introduces a family benchmark, appealing to the question in the 
GSS: “compared to your parents when they were the age you are now, do you think your own 
standard of living now is: much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or 
much worse?”. While this is a valid approach, it is worth noting that it is perhaps a poor 
candidate to explain the flat income-happiness relationship, as it remains fixed over time. In 
other words, for the same individual,  does not change with y, although new cohorts will have 
higher values of  than will older cohorts. Last, as above, it is possible to appeal to indirect 
evidence regarding intra-family comparisons. One of the best-known is Neumark and 
Postlewaite (1998), who model women’s labour force participation as a function of the income 
of their sisters and sisters-in-law, and find broad supporting evidence of relative income effects.  
*
ty
*
ty
Modelling the utility function via proxy variables, such as life or job satisfaction, is not the 
only way to demonstrate social comparisons. One method that essentially inverts the question is 
that of the Welfare Function of Income, associated with the Leyden school in the Netherlands, 
and, particularly, with Bernard van Praag. This predates the work on satisfaction by some years, 
with the first published article being Van Praag (1971). This project involved asking individuals 
to assign income levels (per period) to six different verbal labels (such as "excellent", "good", 
"sufficient" and "bad") and then, based on the values given, estimating for each individual a 
lognormal "Welfare Function of Income". The resulting estimated mean (µ) and variance (σ) 
were then used as dependent variables in regressions which sought to explain which types of 
individuals require a higher level of income to be satisfied, and which individuals have 
valuations that are more sensitive to changes in income.  
The results using cross-country data produced a number of important findings. In terms of 
this paper’s subject, we would like to know who has a higher value of µ (i.e. who needs more 
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money to be satisfied?). Comparisons to others were analysed via the inclusion in the 
regressions of reference group income (usually cell average income over age, education and 
certain other individual or job characteristics) as a right-hand side variable. The empirical results 
(for example, Hagenaars, 1986; and Van de Stadt et al., 1985) show that, ceteris paribus, the 
higher is the reference group's income, the higher are the levels of income assigned by 
individuals to the six verbal labels, as social comparisons over income would imply. 
One of the very few papers ever to appeal to respondent-defined (rather than researcher-
defined) reference groups is Melenberg (1992). He uses 1985 and 1986 Dutch Socio-Economic 
Panel data in which individuals are asked about their social environment – the “people whom 
you meet frequently, like friends, neighbours, acquaintances or possibly people you meet at 
work”. Respondents are asked to indicate the average age, household size, income, education 
and labour force status in this group. Melenberg shows that the average income of this 
(respondent-defined) reference group is positively and significantly correlated with the estimate 
of µ from the WFI: those who associate with higher-earners need more money in order to 
describe their income as good or adequate. 
A further source of evidence on the importance of comparisons to others comes from the 
burgeoning experimental economics literature on fairness. Survey evidence such as Kahneman 
et al. (1986) shows that people have strong views about fairness in economic exchange. 
Laboratory evidence on ultimatum games (Guth and Schwarz, 1982; and Smith, 1994) suggests 
that individuals will throw away real income to obtain a fairer division of a smaller pie. Perhaps 
even more explicitly, Zizzo and Oswald (2001) report the results of an experiment whereby 
subjects in an experiment can pay to burn each other’s money. A majority of subjects chose to 
do so, even though it costs them real earnings. The average subject had half of her earnings 
burnt, and richer subjects were burnt more often. It is tempting to view these experimental 
outcomes in the light of some sort of comparative process.20 
Social comparisons can also be demonstrated by asking individuals to express preferences 
over hypothetical outcomes. Alpizar et al. (2005), Johannsson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Solnick 
and Hemenway (1998) present respondents with states of the world which differ in both the 
absolute and relative domains. For example, in Solnick and Hemenway, individuals are asked to 
choose between states A and B, as follows: 
A: Your current yearly income is $50,000; others earn $25,000. 
B: Your current yearly income is $100,000; others earn $200,000. 
                                                 
20 Comparisons and fairness are not synonyms however: while the former implies that an individual is happy to 
receive more than others, fairness considerations suggest that they would prefer not to.  
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 It is specified that “others” refers to the average of other people in the society, and emphasised 
that “prices are what they are currently and prices (the purchasing power of money) are the 
same in States A and B”. 
All three papers find evidence of strong positional concerns over income, in that individuals 
say they are willing to give up absolute income in order to gain status (choosing A over B 
above). Further, two of the papers ask analogous questions with respect to other life domains, 
and compare the resulting taste for status. Concerns about relative standing in Solnick and 
Hemenway are found to be strongest for attractiveness and supervisor's praise, and weakest for 
vacation time; in Alpizar et al. they are stronger for cars and housing, and weaker for vacations 
and insurance.21 
Finally, it would be useful to appeal to physiological and neurological evidence regarding 
status and relative income. A series of well-known studies22 relates the level of serotonin in 
monkeys to status within the primate group, and show experimentally that it is status that 
produces serotonin, rather than the inverse. We are not aware of experiments that have shown 
that relative income is associated with physiological outcomes. Animal studies have examined 
neuronal activity when faced with pairs of rewards (here different flavours of fruit juice). 
Previous testing allows a preference ranking over fruit juices to be established for each monkey. 
The experimental results show that “striatal neurons do not process reward information in a 
fixed manner but relative to other available rewards” (Cromwell et al, 2005, p.522; see also 
Tremblay and Schultz, 1999). Equally, while there is some evidence that neuron firing is 
determined by the amount of relative reward within a gamble (i.e. relative to the amount that 
could have been won), income comparisons to other individuals have not to our knowledge 
figured in neurological research. 
 
3.3 Adaptation 
The second main explanation of the flat relationship between income and happiness over time is 
adaptation to the arguments of the utility function. Here we are principally concerned with 
adaptation to income, although recent work by economists and psychologists has covered other 
                                                 
21 The current survey concentrates on the relationship between income and utility, and the moderating role of 
comparisons. An active research area in social science concerns the extent of comparisons to others and habituation 
in non-income life domains, such as employment, marriage, and social activities: see Clark (2003, 2005), and Clark 
and Lelkes (2005). 
22 Nicely summarised in Frank (1999), pp.140-142. There is an entire separate literature on health outcomes and 
status: see Marmot (2004) and Cherkas et al. (2006) for example. Research has also shown that suicide is a function 
of relative income (Daly and Wilson, 2005), and that suicide and para-suicide by the unemployed is actually higher 
in low unemployment regions (Platt et al., 1992). 
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life domains, such as unemployment, marriage, divorce and health. With income adaptation, 
individuals get used to their circumstances, so that changes in income have only transient 
effects. Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) define adaptation as ‘a reduction in the affective 
intensity of favourable and unfavourable circumstances’, and the concept of reversion back to 
some baseline hedonic level following temporary highs and lows in happiness has been termed 
the ‘hedonic treadmill’ (Brickman and Campbell, 1971).  
From an economist’s point of view, a simple way of thinking of adaptation to income is in 
terms of an internal backward-looking reference point. We thus remain in the general framework 
of equation (2), but now consider that  is formed from own past incomes. If the individual 
compares her own income at time t to (a geometric average of) that earned over the past three 
years, we would have: 
*
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The final happiness equation to be estimated (the third line) consists of the logs of current 
income and income over the last three periods. This equation can in principle be extended to 
include further lags of current income; if aspirations are important (another internal reference 
point, but this time forward-looking) it may also include expected future incomes. One of the 
main implications of this specification is that the short-run effect of an increase in log income 
equals 1β + 2β  whilst the long-run effect is only 1β . This is obviously analogous to the social 
comparison case, where the marginal utility of higher income was greater when others’ income 
remained constant than when others’ income also changed. In terms of Figure 4, the short-run 
benefit of higher income is illustrated by the dotted lines, whereas the (flatter) thick line shows 
the long-run benefit. 
Figure 6 illustrates a simple case where 1β =0 (so that there is no consumption benefit from 
income), and α =γ =1/3, which corresponds to the situation where the short-run benefit of 
higher income dissipates linearly over the following three years.  
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Figure 6: Change in Happiness following an Income Shock 
 
The top line denotes happiness and the lower line income. This latter is constant for the first two 
years, jumps at the beginning of year two, and remains constant thereafter. At the time of the 
income shock, happiness also jumps, but due to the gradual adaptation of reference income, 
happiness returns to its initial level by the beginning of period five. In this set-up, the only way 
to achieve permanently higher happiness is to have continually rising income.23 We can turn to 
adaptation to explain the Easterlin paradox. Within a country, the richer are more likely to have 
received a positive income shock than are the poorer; they thus report greater happiness (quite 
apart from any consumption benefit of greater income). However, for average happiness to grow 
with GDP per head, we would require that greater GDP levels be positively correlated with GDP 
growth rates. Over the past forty years, this has not been the case within the OECD.  
  
3.4 Evidence of Adaptation 
There is a large literature in psychology that deals with the general issue of adaptation in many 
life domains (see Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999), but only a very few studies have focused 
on income adaptation (see the studies reviewed on their page 313). Perhaps the most famous 
example is that of Brickman et al. (1978), who show using a very small sample of lottery 
winners (n=22) that such a positive income shock does not lead to a significant long-term 
                                                 
23 Not only do rising wage profiles discourage turnover for incentive reasons, in this model they also provide utility 
to the worker.   
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difference in life satisfaction compared to a control group.24 They propose an explanation based 
on the twin concepts of contrast (i.e. winning money opens up new pleasures but also makes 
existing pleasures less enjoyable) and habituation (winners get used to a new standard of living). 
More recent examples of adaptation in non-monetary spheres are Lucas et al. (2003) and Lucas 
(2005) with respect to marriage and divorce, Wu (2001) and Oswald and Powdthavee (2005) for 
adaptation to illness or disability, and Lucas et al. (2004) regarding unemployment. 
Here we are especially interested in adaptation to income changes. One early article is 
Inglehart and Rabier (1986), who use pooled Eurobarometer data from ten Western European 
countries between 1973 and 1983 to show that life satisfaction and happiness scores are 
essentially unrelated to the level of current income, but are positively correlated with a measure 
of change in financial position over the past twelve months. Their conclusion is that aspirations 
adapt to circumstances, such that, in the long run, stable characteristics do not affect well-being. 
In the same tradition, Clark (1999) uses two waves of BHPS data to look at the relationship 
between workers’ job satisfaction and their current and past labour income. The panel nature of 
the BHPS makes it possible to concentrate on individuals who stay in the same firm, and in the 
same position (i.e. have not been promoted or moved job in any other way). Both current and 
past labour income and hours are used as explanatory variables. Past income attracts a negative 
coefficient in the job satisfaction equation, and past hours a positive coefficient, consistent with 
a utility function that depends on changes in these variables. The data suggest a completely 
relative function, with job satisfaction depending only on annual change in the hourly wage. 
Grund and Sliwka (2003) find similar results in German GSOEP panel data. Weinzierl (2005) 
introduces both past income and reference group income (calculated as a cell mean by gender, 
age and education) in life satisfaction equations using the GSOEP data, and finds negative and 
significant coefficients for both. Last, Burchardt (2005) finds evidence of adaptation in income 
satisfaction in ten years of BHPS data, with a suggestion of greater adaptation to rises in income 
than to falls in income. 
A recent detailed study of life satisfaction and income adaptation was carried out by Di Tella 
et al. (2005), who analyse longitudinal data for around 8,000 individuals drawn from the West 
German sample of the GSOEP over the period 1984 to 2000. They find that the effect of an 
income increase after four years is only about 42% of the effect after one year: the majority of 
the short-term effect of income vanishes over time. 
An alternative to using individual income, and its lags, is to concentrate on aggregate 
                                                 
24 Important though this paper is, it is worth noting that the paper is cross-section ex post: no shock is observed. 
Further, winners were actually more satisfied than non-winners, but given the small sample size the difference was 
not significant. 
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income. Di Tella et al. (2003) examine individual happiness in data covering 18 years across 12 
European countries, and argue that some of their results on current and lagged GDP per capita 
show that “bursts of GDP produce temporarily higher happiness” (p.817). 
The Leyden Group (e.g. Hagenaars, 1986; Van de Stadt et al., 1985; Plug, 1997; and Van 
Praag, 1971) explicitly attempt to measure the degree of adaptation to income. The cornerstone 
of this empirical work is the Welfare Function of Income, as described in Section 3.2 above. 
Questions permitting a direct estimate of the income needed to achieve a fixed level of welfare 
were posed in the GSOEP, in the EUROSTAT surveys of the 1980s, in Russian panels, in the 
Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, and in various other surveys. The relationship between this 
required income level and the individual’s past income can then be seen as a direct measure of 
adaptation, or as Van Praag (1971) calls it, “preference drift”. The stylised finding for about 20 
European countries is that a $1 increase in the income of a household leads to a 60 cents 
increase (within about 2 years) in what people consider to be a ‘excellent’, ‘good’, ‘sufficient’ 
and ‘bad’ income. Income adaptation is therefore high, but not complete in this methodology.  
This individual-level result matches up with what is found at the aggregate level concerning 
subjective poverty (having an income lower than that was deemed minimal). European countries 
which are on average poorer (such as Greece and Portugal) are found to have many more 
respondents whose own income was below an insufficient level than richer European countries 
such as Germany or Switzerland. For instance, subjective poverty was about 3% in West 
Germany in the 1990s, but up to 90% in Russia in 1993 (Van Praag and Frijters, 1999). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) summarise a number of their results on preferences from 
small-scale surveys as being consistent with a model where "the carriers of value or utility are 
changes in wealth, rather than final asset positions that include current wealth" (p. 273). The 
empirical results from what remains a relatively small and new literature are consistent with 
individuals having a concern for rising income, independent of its current level. At the extreme, 
utility is only dependent on these changes and independent of the level of income. 
A second individual-level reference point is aspirations. The concept is the same as that of 
adaptation: if aspirations rise with own actual income, then the effect of income on happiness 
will be muted.  
As might be imagined, there is only relatively little work here, as it is difficult to know how 
to accurately measure income aspirations.25 Easterlin (2005b) uses direct measures of aspirations 
to show that material aspirations (the big-ticket consumer items that make up the good life) seem 
                                                 
25 Suggestive indirect evidence is easier to come by. Clark (1997) suggests that the stubbornly higher job 
satisfaction reported by British women in BHPS data might partly reflect their lower expectations.  
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to increase in line with ownership of such consumer items. However, this is not true with respect 
to marriage, where over forty percent of those who have been single their entire lives, and are 
aged 45 and over, cite a happy marriage as part of the good life. Two recent papers have taken 
different approaches to measuring income aspirations, and relating them to subjective well-
being. Stutzer (2004) combines the analysis of subjective data with the income evaluation work 
of the Leyden school, by using the answer to the Minimum Income Question26 as a measure of 
individual income aspirations (and thus one measure of y*) in a life satisfaction equation.  
McBride (2006) introduces a novel way of calculating aspirations directly in a matching 
pennies game, where individuals play against computers. The computer chooses heads or tails 
according to (known) probability distributions (for example 80% heads, 20% tails). After each 
round of playing, individuals report their satisfaction with the outcome. McBride’s first 
contribution is to introduce social comparisons in some of the treatments (by telling the 
individual the outcomes of the other players). Second, he is able to identify an aspiration effect 
by varying the heads and tails probabilities played by the computer. Each subject has five 
pennies to play. When paired with a 80% heads, 20% tails computer, the best strategy is to 
always play heads, which gives an expected payoff of four pennies. When paired with a 65% 
heads, 35% tails computer, the best strategy is still to always play heads, but now the expected 
payoff is only 3.25 pennies. By manipulating the probabilities, McBride creates variations in 
aspirations. The empirical analysis shows that satisfaction is a) higher the more one wins, b) 
lower the more others win, and c) lower the higher was the aspiration level.  
Some neurological evidence is presented in Tobler et al. (2005), using animal studies. 
Monkeys were conditioned to expect different small volumes of juice as rewards for successful 
task completion. The authors were then able to measure neuronal activity subsequent to a certain 
reward volume as a function of the conditioned expectation; they conclude that dopamine 
neurons encode value as “the difference between the reward value…and its expected value” 
(pp.1642-1643). 
 
3.5. Do Social Comparison and Adaptation Explain the Easterlin ‘Paradox’? 
Some of the research that we have cited allows us to undertake tentative back-of-the-envelope 
calculations of the relationship between income and happiness. For example, we can take the 
key finding in the Leyden literature that adaptation over time accounts for around 60% of the 
effect of income (i.e. income’s effect in the long run is only 40% of its effect in the short run), 
                                                 
26 Where individuals are asked to indicate the sum per period they think is the absolute minimum net family income 
their family requires to make ends meet. This was introduced in Goedhart et al. (1977). 
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which corresponds closely to the results in Di Tella et al. (2005). We can further appeal to one 
of the best sources of information on the extent of social comparisons, Knight and Song’s (2006) 
finding that relative income is at least twice as important for individual happiness as actual 
income, even in poor regions (in their case rural China). Together, this suggests a utility function 
in which 2/3 of aggregate income has no effect because it is status-related, and thus disappears 
in a zero-sum game, and where 60% of the effect at the individual level evaporates within 2 
years due to adaptation. Hence only around 13% of the initial individual effect will survive in 
the long run at the aggregate level.27 Precisely such a happiness function is shown in Figure 4, 
which represents the basic aspects of the Easterlin ‘Paradox’ shown in Figures 1 and 2. It is 
possible that even this small positive long-run effect may be an overestimate, as new generations 
or cohorts may start with higher aspiration levels than older generations. Any such 
intergenerational adaptation of aspirations would further diminish the long-run aggregate effect 
of higher income, but is at present still ill-accounted for in the literature. 
 
3.6 Key Challenges in Empirical Work 
Akin to many areas of applied economics, establishing the nature of the empirical relationship 
between income and happiness faces a number of challenges, even if we presume happiness is 
perfectly measured and conforms to experienced utility. Here we highlight a number of the key 
difficulties. 
Firstly, economic theory often dictates that the relevant measure of welfare is consumption, 
not income, and that income in happiness regressions is only a noisy proxy for consumption 
(Weinzierl, 2005). As such researchers will tend to underestimate the importance of material 
circumstances on happiness. Headey and Wooden (2004) go some way toward addressing this 
issue. They use Australian panel data (HILDA) and find that ‘net worth’, which is arguably a 
better proxy for current consumption than a transitory measure of income, matters broadly at 
least as much as does income in determining happiness. As they conclude: ‘the unimportance of 
material circumstances has been exaggerated’. The main reasons why consumption and income 
may differ are the consumption that individuals obtain directly from others, and deferred 
consumption via savings. Regarding the first of these, individuals in developed economies are 
provided with a great deal of consumption goods via the State, such as education, health care, 
and transfers-in-kind, which are only rarely taken into account in empirical estimations. If public 
goods consumption is not directly measured, then proxy variables, such as local area or country 
                                                 
27 Weinzierl (2005) includes both cell-average reference group income (by age, sex and education) and lagged 
income in a life satisfaction equation. The estimated coefficients imply that satisfaction is completely relative with 
respect to income. We do not know, however, whether this definition of the reference group is apt. 
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income, which are related to public goods via taxation, will pick up positive coefficients. This 
will pollute the status effect of aggregate incomes on happiness, suggesting that the coefficients 
on aggregate incomes in happiness regressions suffer from upward bias if public good 
consumption is not taken into account.  
Even measuring personal consumption is difficult. Not only will individuals likely have 
difficulty in remembering how much of their income they have saved in financial assets, but 
more fundamentally it is difficult to establish empirically a clean borderline between purchases 
that have only current consumption benefits and purchases with some future consumption 
benefit. How much of a car or a house purchased today should be counted as current 
consumption and how much as future consumption? How much is education current status 
consumption, and how much is it an investment? Issues such as these, which relate to the 
majority of major purchase decisions, are very tricky and create a significant rift between 
theoretical models and empirical estimates of consumption. If we do use individual income 
instead of consumption in happiness regressions, we should remember that income is an 
overestimate of what is consumed when young (when we save) and an underestimate when old 
(when we dis-save). Forcing income to have a single coefficient over all ages then implies an 
upward bias in the effect of age on happiness.  
The second major empirical difficulty, as already briefly mentioned above, is to correctly 
identify reference groups, especially when individuals move a great deal in their lifetimes and 
reside in high population-density areas. Only very few studies ask individuals about their 
reference groups, rather than simply imposing one. As noted in Section 3.2, Melenberg (1992) 
asks respondents directly about the income of the people with whom they interact often. We are 
only aware of one study where respondents were given a list of options and asked to explicitly 
state to whom who they compare themselves. We have already noted that in Knight and Song 
(2006), 68% of survey respondents in China reported that their main comparison group 
consisted of individuals in their own village, whereas only 11% stated that their main 
comparison group consisted of individuals from outside of the village.28  
Nearly all of the rest of the literature has had to assume a particular reference income, and 
therefore inserts variables into the empirical model such as the individual’s predicted income 
according to her characteristics or the income in some geographical area, which is less 
convincing. The generic problem with using constructed reference groups is that they might pick 
                                                 
28 Wave 3 (2006) of the European Social Survey will go some way to filling this lacuna. Individuals are first asked 
“How important is it to you to compare your income with other people’s incomes?” They are then asked “Whose 
income would you be most likely to compare your own with?”, with responses on a showcard of Work colleagues, 
Family members, Friends, and Others. 
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up effects other than social comparison: average income by geographical area will likely also 
measure local public good consumption; co-workers’ income may pick up measurement error in 
own reported income; and income predicted from a regression may reflect own expected future 
income. Therefore, in the absence of clean measurement of reference groups, we have to be 
cautious when claiming to know the full importance of social comparisons over income. 
A third point is that the group of individuals (or countries), to whom individuals compare is 
assumed to be exogenous, and not a matter of choice. Falk and Knell (2004) ask what happens if 
individuals can partly choose their reference group.29 To obtain interior solutions for this choice, 
the psychological literature has distinguished between ‘self-enhancement’ and ‘self 
improvement’ motives. A concern for status implies that individuals will choose low-income 
reference groups: this is ‘self-enhancement’. In the extreme, everyone would compare 
themselves to the poorest individual(s), which clearly does not fit reality. The ‘self 
improvement’ motive then posits some indirect benefit to having a higher-income reference 
group. One such benefit works through the cost of effort: “people perform better and are more 
successful if they set themselves high goals or compare with high reference standards” (p. 421). 
The main result of Falk and Knell’s model is that the endogenously-chosen reference level 
increases with individual ability (as measured by the rate of transformation of effort into output), 
so that higher-ability individuals will choose higher-income reference groups. The choice of 
reference group will then be based on the trade-off between status and the higher output that 
comes from lower effort cost. Rablen (2006) considers an explicit dynamic model where agents 
face self-control problems (there are future benefits from current effort). He shows that the 
"planner", who maximises the individual's intertemporal utility, may find it optimal to introduce 
a reference level into the utility function. The optimum reference level comes from the trade-off 
between the direct utility cost of evaluating outcomes relatively and the future benefits from 
higher current effort levels. Stark (2004a, 2004b, 2005) has written a number of papers which 
appeal to reference group choice to better explain migration decisions of heterogenous 
individuals. We will return the possibility of endogenous reference group formation in Section 4, 
but note here that the empirical happiness literature is still in its infancy on this issue. 
A fourth challenge concerns the timing of income changes: the empirical prediction from the 
loss-aversion hypothesis of Tversky and Kahneman (1991) is that the absolute effect of a loss of 
one dollar, from an initial reference position, on individual happiness is greater than the effect of 
a gain of one dollar. Any test of this prediction, which is highly relevant for many economic 
                                                 
29 A related question is treated in Oxoby (2004): what if individuals can choose the domains over which status 
comparisons take place? 
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phenomena (see Section 4), will require precise observation of both the timing of income 
movements and the timing of reference income movements. Panel data, in which individuals are 
typically interviewed only once per year, is consequently severely limited in its ability to 
distinguish asymmetric happiness responses to incomes that are above and below the reference 
position. At present, only experiments can address this asymmetry, but even these face well-
known limitations: experimental subjects are very often non-representative; the laboratory 
situation itself may lack realism; and laboratory experiments on social phenomena are inherently 
unsuitable for the measure of meaningful adaptation (such as the adaptation of reference groups) 
as subjects cannot be kept in the laboratory for sufficiently long periods of time. Until we can 
better track movements in both income and reference income, the loss-aversion hypothesis will 
remain difficult to verify in this literature. 
A fifth challenge is to deal with the issue of missing variables. No data set has all the 
variables one might wish and their absence leads to problems. Missing variables lead onto the 
issue of the endogeneity of key variables, the issue of spurious relations between income and 
happiness, and the problem of slope heterogeneity. 
The first effect of missing variables is to lead to potential endogeneity of income, as noted in 
Section 1. It is not unlikely that happy people, or, equivalently, individuals with ‘happy’ 
personality traits, are more likely to obtain better jobs (see Lyubomirsky et al., 2005); Barker 
(2005) similarly concludes that many later life outcomes depend on adverse influences during 
early development, and specifically links both income and depression to birth size. Lacking 
personality traits and early life influences as variables in the data implies that income becomes 
endogenous. Drawing on these arguments, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) find in GSOEP 
data that the partial correlation coefficient between changes in income and changes in happiness 
is smaller than that between levels of income and levels of happiness. They advocate panel data 
techniques to account for unobserved fixed individual traits that produce endogeneity problems. 
However, even fixed-effect estimation will not identify time-varying factors that lead to both 
greater happiness and higher income, producing spurious correlation. Good health, which allows 
individuals to obtain better jobs and increases well-being, is a good candidate for a missing 
factor that may lead to a spurious correlation; marital stability and good relations with co-
workers are other possibilities. While the omission of these types of variable in happiness 
regressions leads to an upward bias on the income coefficient, the reverse holds with variables 
that are themselves influenced by income and which are included as separate regressors in a 
happiness regression. Health again fits the bill, as does housing and even marital status: these 
outcomes are improved by higher incomes but are included in the regression as exogenous 
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factors, so that the income coefficient is biased downwards. The balance of such conflicting 
effects is hard to predict. 
Recent years have seen a number of papers appealing to natural experiments to skirt the 
issue of endogeneity by providing some exogenous variation in income.30 Frijters et al. (2004a, 
2004b, 2006) consider the large changes in real incomes observed in East Germany (following 
reunification) and Russia (following transition) as exogenous, and find a greater effect of 
income on happiness than in much of the existing literature. Gardner and Oswald (2006b) use 
information on lottery winnings in the BHPS as exogenous income movements. In both level 
and panel equations, lottery winnings are found to significantly reduce mental stress scores. It is 
worth underlining that natural data will only very rarely produce truly exogenous income 
movements, although this is an issue for all the work in applied microeconomics for which 
income is important. 
Missing variables at the aggregate level are an important worry since any variable that 
correlates positively with income and negatively with happiness may, if excluded from the data, 
give the false impression that income does not lead to greater happiness and would thus be able 
to explain the Easterlin Paradox. Some candidates which might spring to mind in this context are 
pollution, social capital, and hours of work. Can any of these indeed explain why growth is not 
making us happier? Probably the most detailed attempt at tackling this research question is Di 
Tella and MacCulloch (2005) using 23 years of Eurobarometer data and 28 years of American 
GSS data. They examine a series of potential omitted variables which could explain why 
increasing income has not led to more happiness. These are life expectancy, pollution (measured 
as kilograms of Sulphur Oxide emissions per capita), unemployment and inflation, hours 
worked, the divorce rate, crime and income inequality. Their empirical results show that most of 
these are correlated with life satisfaction in the expected manner. However, their inclusion as 
right-hand side variables does not explain why rising income has not produced rising well-being 
because, like income, these additional variables also improve over time without increasing 
happiness: in their own words “introducing omitted variables worsens the income-without-
happiness paradox”.  
Missing variables may also lead to different individuals having a different marginal benefit 
from income i.e. ‘slope heterogeneity’. Presuming the same coefficient on income over the 
whole sample may not be appropriate if there are important interacting variables omitted from 
                                                 
30 An alternative is to instrument income, although the task of finding instruments which affect income but not 
subjective well-being is a hard one. Lydon and Chevalier (2001) instrument income via spousal characteristics in a 
sample of UK University graduates, which leads to a doubling of the size of the income coefficient in a job 
satisfaction equation. 
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the data. Has the literature found any such interacting variables? The answer appears to be yes: a 
recent example is Lelkes (2006), who shows that the religious were less affected, in life 
satisfaction terms, by income movements during economic transition in Hungary. If religiosity 
were a missing variable in this example, there would have been slope heterogeneity on 
unobservables in Hungary. Clark et al. (2005) argue that such slope heterogeneity is likely to be 
present in many more settings and propose to identify it on functional form assumptions on the 
error term and the allowed types of slope heterogeneity. They use latent class techniques applied 
to three waves of European Community Household Panel data to identify four different classes, 
in terms of both intercept and the estimated coefficient on income in financial satisfaction 
equations. 
A sixth and final challenge is the issue of the estimation method. Frey and Stutzer’s (2002a) 
plea for greater use of panel techniques to overcome some of the missing variables problems 
signalled above has largely been heeded. However, little attention has been paid to the exact 
specification of the independent variables and one can think of many non-linearities that may be 
important in actual work but that are usually ignored. In particular, the consensus use of log 
income in well-being equations may hide important deviations for log-linearity. What it may 
miss is the presence of  kinks, not only over time (as in loss-aversion), but also regarding 
comparisons to others: is the return to having one dollar more than the neighbour the exact 
opposite as having one dollar less? Better data and more flexible estimation techniques are 
needed to address this challenge. 
4. Some Implications for Economic Theory and Policy Design 
We now turn to a discussion of the implications for economic theory and policy design of social 
comparisons and adaptation. Some of these implications have been presented in general terms 
(e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2002a; Layard, 2005; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006), but we here 
provide a more formal and wide-ranging discussion of these economic issues. In particular we 
focus on the core issues of economic growth, labour supply, wage profiles, optimal taxation and 
consumption, savings and investment, and migration.  
 
4.1 Economic Growth 
We start with the ongoing debate about whether economic growth leads to greater happiness. 
Easterlin (1974, 1995) and others since (e.g. Lane, 2001) have argued that economic growth in 
Western countries does not lead to greater happiness, backed up by the fact that happiness levels 
are essentially flat in Western countries over time (Figures 1 and 2). Yet, in countries that started 
out from much lower levels, income growth has been associated with modest increases in 
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happiness (Frijters et al., 2004a, 2004b, 2006). In terms of the models described in Section 3, it 
can be argued that most developed countries appear to be at a point of personal consumption ct 
where the marginal utility from  is minimal, while for poorer countries there are still gains 
to be had in  from higher personal consumption. Further economic growth in developed 
countries then has little aggregate effect because reference incomes increase in line with income, 
producing no change in  with higher income. This explanation for the Easterlin 
Paradox has been widely adopted (see, for example, Easterlin, 1995, 2001; Veenhoven, 1997; 
McBride, 2001; and Layard, 2005). Equivalent formulations are the assertion that at certain 
levels of development only conspicuous consumption is important, or that ‘keeping up with the 
Jones’s’ is the main economic motive in rich countries. 
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However, one possible weak point in this explanation is that it presumes that economic 
growth only affects consumption levels and has no effect on the distribution of income. If we 
relax this assumption, the effect of inequality on aggregate happiness also becomes relevant. For 
example, if we think of the second sub-utility function  as concave, with everyone in 
the country sharing the same reference income (some national ‘norm’), then it is immediate that 
at a given level of aggregate income, personal consumption and work choices, a country with a 
more unequal income distribution will be less happy on average: the additional status benefit of 
the individual with one dollar more than the norm does not compensate the additional status loss 
of the person with one dollar less than the norm. This is an additional rationale for pursuing 
income equality as a policy goal over and above the usual argument that consumption equality 
has welfare benefits due to concavity in the subutility . The effect of economic growth on 
happiness then hinges on the relationship between growth and inequality. 
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There is also a flip side to the argument that greater economic prosperity at some point 
ceases to buy more happiness. It can be argued that it is actually the concern for relative income 
embodied in the second sub-utility function  that keeps economic growth going 
beyond some wealth level. The argument here is that relative concerns are more important in 
rich countries, as personal consumption plays an increasingly marginal role: status is a luxury 
good. The driving force behind hard work in rich countries, despite high aggregate consumption 
levels, is the concern for status. This is indeed one possible evolutionary reason for having a 
term  in the utility function in the first place (Rayo and Becker, 2004). This argument 
has a long ancestry in economic debates. Bernard Mandeville’s 1705 ‘Fable of the Bees’ puts 
the argument allegorically. Mandeville juxtaposes two hypothetical beehives: one in which the 
bees only care about sustaining themselves and have no interest in status (i.e. there is only 
*
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1 ( )tU c  and ) and another where status is what mainly matters (i.e. there is mainly 
). Mandeville postulates that the first beehive would be happy but not very rich, and 
is ultimately doomed to be taken over by the second beehive where the bees are mainly 
motivated by status (by ). In that second beehive, the bees would keep working and 
looking for opportunities both within and outside their beehive to further their relative standing, 
leading to continual expansion and growth of the second beehive.  
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Mandeville’s observations have since been echoed by many others. Adam Smith, for 
example, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, noted, ‘To what purpose is all the toil and bustle of 
this world?... It is our vanity which urges us on.’ The modern-day equivalent of the argument by 
Mandeville and Smith and many other early economists is made in theoretical models by 
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Corneo and Jeanne (2001), and Pham (2005). The key aspect of 
these models is that they specify  as , and  as , where  
denotes wealth instead of income. These models abstract from the possibility of leisure, but it is 
the  part of the utility function in these models that drives continued economic 
growth. A related argument in Fershtman et al. (1996) is that social status is determined in part 
by relative education, therefore linking economic growth via education to status considerations.  
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Normatively speaking, the dominance of the status motive in the income/happiness 
relationship means the benefits of economic growth are not to be found in greater happiness. 
There are other reasons indirectly related to utility that would still provide a rationale for 
economic growth, much in the vein of Mandeville’s arguments: the link between the length of 
life and (aggregate) income; the link between the ability to withstand foreign aggression and 
economic activity; the ability to attract migrants when income levels are relatively high; and 
some status utility benefit to a country as a whole from having high income compared to other 
countries. Each of these elements relates to other literatures which we will only touch upon in 
the remainder of the paper.  
 
4.2 Labour Supply 
Mandeville and his successors predicted that labour supply would remain high during economic 
expansions, as a result of status motives. Along the same lines, Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) 
note that in models where only personal consumption matters, with decreasing marginal utility 
of consumption, we should see falling aggregate labour supply as aggregate consumption rises, 
just as the bees in Mandeville’s first beehive cease to work hard. In the utility function (1) 
above, however, there is a limit to the long-run reduction in labour supply with increasing 
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consumption, because the relative term  is independent of consumption. Neumark 
and Postlewaite argue that status concerns in the income/happiness link are the main reason why 
labour supply has not declined dramatically in the 20th century, despite the very significant rise 
in consumption levels. The same conclusions arise if we consider the job, rather than the income 
associated with it, as the carrier of status: here too, labour supply will be relatively unresponsive 
to overall consumption levels. Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) and Vendrik (1998) point out that 
there may be intermediate factors between relative income concerns and labour supply 
decisions, such as social norms with respect to appropriate labour supply decisions that 
themselves in the long-run are determined by the payoffs to a more basic utility function. They 
also argue that female labour supply has increased in many countries as a result of changing 
wages, but more slowly than expected because the associated social norms took time to adjust. 
Both Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) and Park (2006) provide empirical tests of female labour 
supply as a function of relative income.31  
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Layard (2005) explicitly argues that labour supply implications of income comparisons 
provide a rationale for growth-reducing taxation designed to bring about greater leisure. In this 
context, note that the model in (1) can be extended by supposing that status games may involve 
not only income, but also time-investments. Veblen (1899) recognised this by talking about 
conspicuous consumption and ‘conspicuous leisure’. This latter consists of all time investments 
whose main payoff is demonstrating to other people that one can afford to spend time on leisure: 
examples might be showing off (productively) useless skills (such as speaking Latin, or playing 
a musical instrument), which signal an abundance of time not used to increase . The tax 
implication is now far less clear, as we would ideally want to tax all investments into status 
races equally, so as to promote non-conspicuous consumption and leisure. Layard (1980) even 
went so far as to recognise that one may want to sustain several status races rather than fewer, 
because more races have more winners. The question then arises how multiple status races can 
be sustained, all the while countering crowding-out effects on non-conspicuous consumption 
and leisure. Frijters and Leigh (2005) hypothesise that conspicuous leisure is lower in mobile 
environments because mobility reduces the visibility of leisure more than that of consumption. 
Empirically, they find that US states with higher mobility rates also have higher aggregate levels 
of investment in conspicuous consumption (i.e. higher labour supply), both at any moment in 
time and through time. The average number of hours worked per week per working age person 
1( )tU c
                                                 
31 A related issue is how hard individuals work once employed: their effective labour supply. A recent paper (Clark 
et al., 2006) appeals to both survey and experimental data to show that effort at work is a function of income 
relative to that of one’s reference group. 
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over 1981-2003 in US states with the highest level of internal mobility is about 28, as compared 
to 26 hours in a standard week for states with the lowest level of internal mobility. The authors 
advocate mobility taxes to help restore the balance between conspicuous consumption and 
conspicuous leisure. 
 
4.3 Wage Profiles 
Kahneman et al. (1991) conclude from choice experiments that individuals are, at the margin, 
about twice as sensitive to losses as they are to gains; this is labelled loss-aversion or status quo 
bias. To reflect loss-aversion, we can appeal to a specification of the status component of utility, 
, as follows: *2 ( | )t tU y y
 
*
* * *
2 [ ]
*
0
( | ) 2 ( ) ( ) *
t t
t t t t t t y y
t
t s t s
s
U y y f y y f y y I
y w y
>
−
=
= − − −
= ∑        (6) 
 
where the second term reflects the lower marginal utility of income higher than  relative to 
income lower than , so that there is a kink at . This reference income itself can be 
considered as some weighted average of previous incomes. Figure 7 illustrates this kind of 
utility function in the context of increasing or decreasing income profiles. For ease of 
illustration, reference income is set to equal income in the previous period.  
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Figure 7: Importance of Kinks in the Utility Function 
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This figure is read as follows. In the top panel, where income rises over time, income at t 
exceeds reference income, , so that the individual is on the relatively flat part of the utility 
function. At time t+1, the reference income is now equal to yt, so that the whole utility function 
shifts to the right. As income at t+1 is higher than income at t, the individual is again on the flat 
part of the curve. As time goes on, the utility function shifts further and further to the right.  
*
ty
The opposite occurs in the lower panel, where the income profile is decreasing. To make the 
point that the same number of dollars are being disbursed in the two profiles, the income figures 
exactly match vertically. With the decreasing profile, the individual always receives less than 
her reference income, which is heavily penalised by this utility function. Consequently, utility is 
far lower under the decreasing income profile than under the increasing income profile, despite 
the actuarial value of the decreasing income profile being higher: any positive discount rate will 
produce higher present-discounted value from the profile with the higher income first. Note that 
we do not actually require loss-aversion for this conclusion, which is driven by the evolution of 
reference income over time, but that the kinked utility function reinforces the preference for 
growth. In fact, individuals will show similar preferences over two positively-sloped income 
profiles, where loss-aversion plays no role. The steeper profile will be preferred, ceteris paribus, 
as income at each period will be evaluated relative to a lower reference point (a lower past 
income), producing higher utility.  
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Given this preference for income growth, independent of the income level, employers can 
save money by offering an increasing profile with lower actuarial value rather than a decreasing 
profile with higher actuarial value; individuals prefer the former even if they are perfectly 
rational. Frank and Hutchens (1993) and Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) use evidence from 
small-sample surveys to show that individuals do indeed express a preference for wage profiles 
which rise over time, even though these have lower present discounted values than alternative 
profiles with constant or decreasing wages.  
 Kinks in the utility function, also termed loss-aversion, have more implications than simply 
helping to explain upward-sloping wage profiles within firms. We would also expect employers 
to be likely to offer contracts guaranteeing no income reductions over the working life i.e. an 
endogenous absence of demotion and institutionalised downward wage rigidity. McDonald 
(2002) motivates an asymmetric utility function including loss-aversion, and then argues in a 
simple micro-macro model that it creates downward wage rigidity at the level of firms which in 
turn generates Keynesian business cycles. This also fits well with the empirical observation of 
Teulings and Hartog (1997) that wage decreases are virtually never observed within 
organisations in Europe because individuals are sacked rather than demoted. Patacconi and 
Ederer (2005) also invoke sensitivity to relative decreases in job status to rationalise the lack of 
observed empirical demotions within organisations. 
 A potentially fruitful avenue for future research along these lines is to test the hypothesis 
that retirement partly results from individuals being unwilling to take a step back within their 
organisation, and thus choosing retirement over wage cuts or demotion. Retirement would then 
generically follow the moment at which individual productivity peaks, even though workers may 
still have many highly productive years left. This comes about simply because individuals are 
loath to accept jobs and wages that are below their current reference position. In this situation, 
there is a case for deferring rewards for production until later in life i.e. to smooth wages such 
that they will increase up to some fixed age, which in turn raises the issue of credible long-term 
contracts and mandatory retirement. 
 
4.4 Poverty 
The relative importance of the three components of the utility function in (1) is crucial for the 
measurement of poverty. One common representation is that individuals are in poverty if their 
material consumption levels falls below some subsistence level; this appeals to a critical level of 
 rather than to overall happiness. This approach is behind concepts like the absolute 
poverty line, the cost of minimum calorie intake line, and minimum living standards, such as the 
1( )tU c
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minimum consumption basket defining the poverty line in the US, or the 1$ a day poverty line 
used by the World Bank. However, Sen (1983) and many others in the poverty literature have 
explicitly argued that relative concerns also matter for individuals, and that we should base the 
poverty line on relative rather than absolute consumption. In this vein, the OECD publishes 
statistics on the number of individuals whose income is below half of median income in member 
countries, and the European Union currently employs a poverty line set at 60% of median 
income. In terms of equation (1), these relative representations of poverty assume that the 
 component of utility is the most important for individuals. The measurement of 
poverty via U2 does however pose problems once we realise that the norm level of income, yt*, 
is liable to evolve over time. For instance, if  depends on own past income, then, at a given 
level of own current income yt, an individual whose income just increased has a higher utility 
than someone whose income just decreased, so that poverty depends on both income levels and 
income profiles. In practise, taking income adaptation into account for relative poverty measures 
would be very difficult. 
*
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Neither absolute nor relative poverty lines introduce any explicit role for the non-material 
aspects of utility, and are therefore not yet based on happiness. To make the distinction clear 
between happiness and whatever we currently mean by poverty, think of a factor like sunshine. 
No known definition of poverty considers it to be relevant whether a materially poor person 
enjoys more hours of sunshine than a rich person who suffers in a cold climate, even if the 
materially poorer person is happier. Implicitly, sunshine and all of the other non-income factors 
influencing happiness are considered as orthogonal to poverty, even though they are highly 
relevant for both happiness and individual decision-making. Poverty as currently operationalised 
concerns the sub-utilities  and , instead of happiness proper (U). A more 
happiness-based poverty measure would take into account non-material elements to provide a 
broader picture of well-being (the lives that individuals live), and would also jar less with the 
commonplace observation that individuals freely make a number of choices that leave them 
materially worse off (such as having children).  
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4.5 Optimal Taxation and Consumption 
A burgeoning literature in recent years has addressed the optimal tax implications of utility 
functions which depend on relative income; this literature both relies on and produces 
predictions about the precise empirical properties of the income/happiness relationship. To our 
knowledge, this theoretical literature has not in the past been explicitly connected to the 
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empirical happiness literature, despite there being clear potential gains from such integration 
(Weinzierl, 2005). 
 One of the most influential papers on optimal taxation is Frank (1985), who adopts the 
following utility function: 
 
0 0 1( , ( ), )U U c R c c=           (7) 
 
where  is the consumption of some positional good, potentially including both positional 
material goods (conspicuous consumption) and positional immaterial goods (conspicuous 
leisure). This first term of (7) corresponds to  in equation (1). The second term in the 
utility function 
0c
1 ( )tU c
0( )R c  denotes the individual’s consumption rank with respect to the positional 
good: this term corresponds broadly to . The third term  denotes a non-positional 
good and corresponds loosely to 
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3( ,t tU T l Z1 )− . The basic point made by Frank (1985) is that 
utility maximisation means that individuals consume  up to the point where total marginal 
utility is zero: 
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 is the marginal utility of the consumption of the positional good keeping rank 
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 is the marginal utility of the consumption of the positional good via 
its effect on rank, and 1 0 0 1
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 is the indirect effect of the increased consumption 
of the positional good via the (reduced) consumption of the non-positional good. The precise 
form of 1
0
dc
dc
 is given by the budget constraint that fixes total income, allowing non-positional 
goods  to include both leisure and consumption activities. Frank emphasises that 1c
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 is a pure externality: changes in rank have no social benefit even though they 
yield private benefits. This additional benefit of positional goods to an individual leads to 
societal over-consumption of positional goods, to the detriment of non-positional goods. Frank 
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then points out that this externality produces a rationale for the taxation of the positional good, 
in order to promote the non-positional good. If we equate the positional good to relative income 
and the non-positional good to leisure, we obtain a rationale for income taxation in order to 
promote leisure. Layard (2005) adopts this argument.32 
A number of other authors have adopted different specifications of the utility function, and 
of the reference position in particular, which affect the tax implications. For example, if we take 
the utility function in Ireland (1994): 
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where  is a good whose consumption is unobservable, and  is status, specified as the 
belief spectators have about 
1c 0( )s c
0 1( , )f c c  based on observing . Exactly as in Frank (1985), Ireland 
derives a general tendency to over-consumption of the observable good  for a wide class of 
possible information regimes. He also illustrates the Pareto improvements that can be attained 
via income taxation coupled with direct transfers of  to the poor.  
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Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) use a similar utility function, but concentrate on changes in 
optimal tax policy over the business cycle. Their main utility function is: 
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with tc  being the population average of individual consumption , and  denoting labour 
supply. This utility function is analogous to that in equation (1), albeit  and 
tc l
tc tc  are entered as 
separable functions. The externality embedded in the presence of tc  leads to labour supply that 
is too high, very much in the same mould as Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) and Frank (1985). 
Ljungqvist and Uhlig show that this externality can be perfectly countered by a constant 
marginal tax on , independent of the business cycle. The analysis is then extended by 
considering the reference position not as 
tc
tc , but as 1tc −  i.e. average consumption last period. In 
the presence of aggregate productivity shocks, they find that optimal tax rates co-move with 
                                                 
32 There’s an old literature arguing that ‘social preferences’ (including also altruism) can only be identified from 
observed transfers under restrictive assumptions (though direct utility measures do not suffer from this): see Oswald 
(1983) on the difficulties for the case of taxation and Ng (1987) for the related problem of public good provision.  
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current productivity shocks, creating counter-cyclical effects of taxation on the economy. This is 
exactly in line with the usual Keynesian optimal tax policy which is also counter-cyclical.  
 
4.6 Savings and Investment 
A related recent theoretical literature has emerged on the dynamic effects of relative 
consumption concerns (status concerns). The papers we mention here abstract from the 
possibility of a term like  and focus in the main on the timing of consumption. The 
key question addressed is the optimality of savings.  
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We might naïvely think that status does not affect savings, because the trade-off between 
current and future status would seem to be identical to the trade-off between current and future 
consumption. However, this line of thinking breaks down when we consider that individuals 
accumulate wealth over their lifetime, and that productivity generally increases, implying that in 
a stylised sense the reference income when ‘old’ is always higher than when ‘young’. In this 
case, relative concerns will change the marginal utility of consumption over the lifecycle and 
therefore affect saving and investment decisions. Most of the generic arguments that arise can be 
illustrated via the utility function introduced by Abel (1990), and subsequently adopted by a 
number of other authors: 
 
(1 )(1 )
(1 )( ) * ( )
1
t t
t
t
c c
U
c
η α
η α
α
− −
−= − %        (11) 
 
Here  is own consumption and  is the geometric mean of the consumption of a reference 
group, which can be construed as the rest of the population or some slowly-adjusting social 
norm containing past generations’ or the individual’s previous consumption. The parameter 
tc tc%
η , 
0<η <1, denotes a kind of ‘weight’ for relative concerns in individual utility; and α >0 reflects 
risk-aversion (α =0 implies risk-neutrality). The key characteristics of this utility function are 
revealed when we consider that the individual’s marginal utility from own consumption when 
reference income  is high or low depends crucially on tc% α . The main possibilities are depicted 
in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Utility of Consumption with High/Low Reference Consumption, and α <1 and α >1 
 
 
The two lines in the top panel of this Figure, where 0<α <1, show how higher reference income 
(the thin line) will reduce not only utility, but also the marginal utility from own consumption. 
As such, when 0<α <1, individuals will want higher consumption when reference consumption 
is lower: individuals will want to plan consumption in the periods when other individuals are not 
consuming. This creates a coordination problem, as reference consumption results from 
simultaneous choices by everyone in the economy (for example if the reference point refers to 
average consumption by others). The difficulty in solving such a coordination problem in 
endogenous growth models has to date appeared unsurpassable (Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000, 
and Abel, 2005, simply assume that α >1). Even so, it seems intuitively plausible to presume 
that the marginal (status) utility of consumption is higher when the consumption of others is 
lower. Intuitively also, we might think that when 0<α <1, savings will be too low: individuals 
will not postpone consumption to the future as future general consumption levels then will likely 
be higher due to productivity growth. 
 We obtain exactly the opposite results when α >1, corresponding to the lower panel of 
Figure 8, which is the dominant assumption made in the literature. Here again, individual utility 
falls as reference consumption rises, but now the marginal utility of consumption increases. 
Individuals will want to consume more when others consume more, producing a kind of herding 
phenomenon: status is then a bandwagon good in the terminology of Duesenberry (1949). There 
is no difficult coordination issue to solve as all consumers will want to consume at the same 
time. The corollary is that individuals all save too much at the same time, because they all want 
to consume more towards the end of their lives, when the consumption of others will also be 
higher due to productivity increases.  
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In the terminology of Dupor and Liu (2003), the case with α >1 can be called ‘Keeping up 
with the Joneses’ and that with α <1 ‘Running away from the Joneses’. Crucially, the issue of 
whether the parameter α  is in fact greater than one or not can in principle be empirically 
evaluated using happiness data, although this test has not to our knowledge been carried out to 
date. A simple method of obtaining the sign of (α -1) is obtained from the cross-derivative of 
equation (11): 
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It follows from (12) that the sign of the interaction between own consumption and reference 
group consumption in a reduced-form regression should be the same as the sign of (α -1).  
Abel (2005) focuses on this issue in an overlapping two-generation model with a utility 
function for the new-born of the form: 
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where  is own current consumption and  is the geometric mean of the current consumption 
of everyone else alive. The term 
tc tc%
(1 )(1 )( )tc
η α− −  refers to the part of own consumption that is 
independent of others’ consumption, and the term following β  refers to future consumption. 
The main result emerges when we consider the marginal effect of an increase in future 
consumption: 
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When α <1 we obtain the intuitive result discussed above: the marginal return to status 
consumption in the future is lower when 1tc +%  is higher, and therefore when there are general 
productivity increases. The externality from higher future consumption reduces savings, which 
makes the case for subsidies on savings. Again though, the equilibrium under α <1 cannot be 
solved analytically because of the coordination issue mentioned above. Abel thus mainly 
concentrates on cases with α >1, under which general productivity increases, leading to higher 
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future reference incomes , actually increase the future marginal return to status, yielding a 
case for taxes on savings. 
1tc +%
 Carroll et al. (1997, 2000) make a different point by adopting a utility function where the 
reference position only depends on the consumption of the individual herself in the past: 
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This is the same utility function as Abel (1990, 2005) but with what we called an ‘internal 
reference’ point in Section 3. Carroll et al. also concentrate on cases with α >1 and generically 
argue that there will be upward pressure from technological growth on savings, as individuals 
anticipate that the marginal return to future status will be higher. However, in the specification 
of the reference position , there is another effect, related to the speed at which the reference 
point adjusts to current consumption. When the rate of adaptation to consumption changes, ρ, is 
high, individuals essentially only compare to their own recent consumption, and when ρ is small 
(although always positive), adjustment is slow and consumption in the distant past remains 
important. Again, the value of this critical variable, the speed of adjustment, can in principle be 
measured in happiness regressions by the coefficients of past consumption on current happiness.  
tc%
Carroll et al. (2000) also show that when adaptation is slow, it makes sense for individuals to 
save more as economic growth increases, despite the fact that future reference consumption 
levels will be higher. The intuition is that under slow adjustment, individuals wish to ‘smooth 
out income increases’ more than under fast adjustment. On the contrary, if the reference position 
adjusts quickly, individuals essentially want to enjoy the status benefit of higher productivity 
immediately. This model is used to rationalise the empirical regularity that high-growth 
countries also have high savings rates. It is difficult to reconcile this empirical fact with a model 
without reference positions affecting utility: in the latter, the marginal utility of future 
consumption is always lower as economic growth increases because future consumption is 
higher, leading to lower savings rates. Why save now if we are all going to be rich tomorrow 
anyway? Carroll et al.’s answer is that individuals want to adjust slowly to ever higher 
consumption patterns, and it therefore makes sense to save more now, simply to avoid getting 
used to high consumption too soon. This provides the link between savings and the speed of 
adaptation of reference consumption in happiness regressions. 
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 Constantinides (1990) and Gali (1994) use a similar utility function to address the equity 
premium puzzle. Constantinides notes that the existence of internal reference points over 
consumption provides an additional reason for individuals to only slowly adjust their 
consumption over time. Deaton (1992) confirms this prediction by showing in US data that 
individuals over-smooth consumption after permanent income shocks. Constantinides goes 
further by arguing that the presence of  creates a bias in conventional estimates of risk-
aversion, which are based on the tradeoffs people make over time: without  we imagine that 
the savings rates of the rich would be greater than those of the poor with high risk-aversion. The 
fact that savings rates vary only little across income groups may lead us to conclude that risk-
aversion is actually quite low. Constantinides shows that the presence of  breaks this logic, in 
that even with high risk-aversion the presence of a moving reference point leads all individuals 
to smooth income over time in a similar manner. This provides a rationale for instances of high 
instantaneous risk-aversion, in particular the large premium that individuals are prepared to pay 
for risk-free assets versus risky higher-return assets i.e. the equity premium puzzle. Campbell 
and Cochrane (1999) extend this idea to further types of asset pricing puzzles and argue that 
models including a reference point  exhibit superior predictive power over models without 
such a term.  
tc%
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One particular strand of the empirical income-happiness literature fits in well with savings 
models, namely the so-called ‘tunnel-effect’. The original idea is attributed to Hirschman 
(1973), who argued that individuals could actually derive utility from others’ higher incomes if 
they consider them to be informative about their own future income. Senik (2004) uses this 
argument to explain why in Russian panel data (RLMS) individual happiness was positively 
linked to reference group income, rather than negatively as a relative utility function would 
suggest. Equally, Senik (2005) finds that higher reference group income reduces life satisfaction 
in Western Europe, but raises life satisfaction in the post-Transition countries of Eastern Europe 
(and the United States). The potential importance of the information role is underscored by the 
finding that reference group income is more strongly positively correlated with life satisfaction 
for those in more uncertain situations (as measured by the volatility of their income and the 
probability of losing their job, for example). Brown et al. (2006) find some evidence that pay 
satisfaction is positively correlated with average wages within the firm. 
The simplest model in which a tunnel effect can arise is a two-period model where 
individuals only derive utility from their own consumption, but face the problem of saving in 
period 1 in order to consume in period 2. For example, consider: 
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where lifetime utility U is now simply the sum of happiness in period 1, which depends only on 
period 1 consumption, and happiness in period 2, which depends only on period 2 consumption. 
The budget constraint (with an interest rate of r) links period 1 consumption to period 2 income: 
the higher is period 2 income, the higher is period 1 consumption because of a reduced need for 
savings. Now imagine that period 2 income is in fact unknown by the individual decision-maker, 
who estimates her next-period income from the incomes of ‘reference’ individuals around her 
who share the same observable characteristics (region, education, gender, age, etc.). This 
produces a reduced-form lifetime happiness function in the first period that depends positively 
on the observed incomes of reference individuals. Neither adaptation nor social comparisons are 
needed to produce a relationship between happiness and others’ income; although equally, under 
certain parameterisations, tunnel effects can be observed even if relative income or consumption 
matters. 
The tunnel-effect model provides several pointers as to what we should expect to observe 
empirically when we add more information: (i) we should see a positive relationship between 
reference group income and own current consumption, over and above the effect of own income 
(because the higher is others’ income, the lower are one’s own savings); and (ii) we should 
observe that happiness is positively correlated with reported expected future income, and that 
the positive effect of reference group income on one’s own happiness transits via expected 
future income. These tunnel-effect predictions are yet to be empirically tested. 
 
4.7 Migration 
Consider the decision whether to migrate or not. Without a  term in the utility 
function, then all those who find more attractive income and leisure combinations in another 
country will leave. This conclusion changes if we allow for comparisons, and consider that 
migration might lead to changes in . For instance, if  equals average income in the local 
neighbourhood or the average income of people like yourself at your workplace, then someone 
who fears ending up with low relative income in another country would not migrate, even if both 
*
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leisure and the absolute income she could earn there are higher. Stark and Taylor (1991) appeal 
to this idea to explain why the elites in poor countries do not emigrate: the elite are at the top of 
the income distribution in the country they currently live, but may well not be so if they 
emigrate. Stark and Taylor further introduce the notion of different economic migrant types. In 
terms of equation (1), they argue that we would expect those with relatively high earnings 
potential in another country to move abroad e.g. those whose skills are relatively undervalued in 
the country of origin. Furthermore, we expect those who can keep individuals in their home 
(poorer) country as their reference group to be more likely to emigrate than those whose 
reference income adapts to the new country. The former can become high-status in their home 
country by earning more in the host country, yet they remain in a status sense part of the home 
country. This line of thinking can help to explain why many migrants keep visiting their home 
country: this is when they can cash in as relatively high earners compared to those in the home 
country, making it irrelevant whether those same incomes are high in the host country. 
This kind of analysis yields two distinct possible migration dynamics. In the first, those who 
migrate do so voluntarily in spite of adaptation in the  element of their utility 
function. That is, they have exceptionally high skills and can become high-status even in the 
host country and want to compare themselves to persons in the host country anyway. The first 
group of voluntary migrants is therefore made up of high-status assimilators, who Stark (2004a, 
2004b, 2005) identifies with the brain-drain phenomenon. The networks of these early migrants 
may lead to more migration of the same variety, but the fast assimilation of early migrants 
implies that they are not preoccupied by this, as their networks will not primarily consist of other 
migrants from the same home country. The second migration pattern is very different, and may 
well result from exceptionally low consumption in the home country (i.e. by ). For 
example, we can think of the Irish in the US being driven by the potato famine back home, 
forced migration in general, or the ‘guest worker phenomenon’ of the European Union where 
whole villages were essentially transplanted to other countries in the 1960’s. These individuals 
will by design be less likely to assimilate, and have strong incentives to carry on comparing 
themselves to individuals in the home country. This results from their high wages relative to 
those in the home country and low wages relative to the host country. These migrants may for 
the same reason try to attract more low-skill individuals from the home country, as these latter 
do not detract from their own status but rather increase it by reducing the reference income they 
face in the host country. The two types of immigration, associated with two different parts of the 
income/happiness gradient, will therefore have very different cultural and economic implications 
for the host country. Countries such as Canada and Australia, who operate a points system 
*
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whereby potential migrants have to offer something exceptional to the host country in order to 
attain a visa, arguably attempt to attract the first type of economic migrant. Countries in the EU 
that are introducing legislation trying to stop ‘family reunions’ could be interpreted as trying to 
reduce the second kind of economic migrant. More empirical work on the relationship between 
happiness and reference incomes, especially looking at the differences across migrant groups in 
reference incomes, would greatly inform this debate. 
 
4.8 Normative Implications 
Section 4.5 discussed the tax implications of relative utility. These arise due to externalities 
between individuals. Somewhat more subtle are the policy implications of adaptation, which can 
be thought of as externalities within individuals. We discussed above how changing reference 
incomes can affect inter-temporal trade-offs in consumption, wage profiles, and the costs and 
benefits of migration. The general implication is that movements in yt* affect inter-temporal 
trade-offs: events to which individuals adapt quickly only have a happiness payoff in the short 
run, while events where adaptation is slow (or absent), have long-run happiness payoffs. The 
impact of a particular circumstance on current happiness is then only a snapshot of the stream of 
effects on happiness associated with that circumstance, and is therefore in principle not 
necessarily informative about life-time trade-offs. 
What is often not well-understood is that as long as individuals are rational, the mere 
presence of adaptation is no reason for policy intervention unless it is accompanied by an 
externality (such as those found in social comparisons). We may not necessarily want to 
counteract activities which produce only a short-lived happiness ‘buzz’ at the expense of a long-
run happiness cost, unless we believe that individuals are unaware of the fact that the ‘buzz’ may 
indeed only be ephemeral.  
When individuals do not in fact realise that they will get used to some things (but not to 
others), a basic paternalistic question arises. This has been well-stated by many, including 
Kahneman et al. (1997, 1999) and Rabin (1998): Should we only care about what Self 0 (who 
makes the decisions) wants or should we also care about what Self 1 (in the future) experiences? 
Individuals who care only about their desires at time 0 (i.e. Self 0) will take decision utility as 
the normative reference point. If instead we were to take the experiences of Self 1 as the guiding 
principle for policy design, we would potentially act against the explicit wishes of an ‘ignorant’ 
(Self 0) electorate by taxing activities that lead to only short-run happiness gains. An interesting 
political economy question then arises of how governments can do so without being voted out 
by myopic Self 0’s. This question only arises when individuals mis-forecast their degree of 
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adaptation. However, the empirical literature is still only beginning to grapple with the questions 
of differential paces of adaptation to life events. While there is now growing evidence regarding 
the misprediction of adaptation (see Riis et al., 2005, and the research reviewed in Loewenstein 
and Ubel, 2006), the information required to advocate paternalism is currently far from 
complete. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
One of the exciting developments within economics over the last decade has been the booming 
‘economics of happiness’ literature, which has expanded in both theoretical and empirical 
directions. The basis for the empirical work has been the increasing evidence from both 
psychologists and economists that measures of individual well-being collected in surveys 
contain ‘valid variability’, in the sense that current happiness or satisfaction is a strong predictor 
of future behaviour. The wider acceptance of subjective well-being measures as a direct proxy 
for utility has consequently opened up a wide-range of opportunities to further inform theory 
and policy design. The happiness literature has in the last few years began to make major 
inroads in this respect. The analysis of subjective well-being data provides a valuable 
alternative, but complementary, approach to the revealed-preference framework that dominates 
the discipline of economics. 
The two specific issues that have generated the most interest in the literature are (i) the 
effect of labour market status, and especially unemployment, on happiness, and (ii) the 
relationship between income and happiness. This paper has focussed on the latter, motivated by 
its central importance to economists and policy-makers. Our contribution has been to provide a 
new overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on income and happiness, bringing 
together the most recent research, and showing how the traditional utility function framework 
can be readily generalised to incorporate a range of observed behaviours. In particular, our main 
challenge has been to align the widely cited Easterlin ‘Paradox’, that of increasing real incomes 
in developed countries but with no noticeable increase in average happiness, with the large 
empirical survey literature that has found that income and happiness are positively related. In 
particular, a growing number of studies have been able to use some exogenous variation in 
income, to show a significant causal effect of income on happiness.  
The broad consensus in the literature is that the paradox points to the importance of relative 
considerations in the utility function, where higher income brings both consumption and status 
benefits to an individual. These individual benefits can explain the positive slope found in much 
of the empirical literature. However, since status is a zero-sum game, only the consumption 
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benefit of income remains at the aggregate level. Since the consumption benefit approaches zero 
as income rises, happiness profiles over time in developed countries are flat.  
Going beyond the paradox that initiated the literature, this paper has attempted to connect the 
literature on economics and happiness with theoretical economic models of taxation, labour 
supply, economic growth, savings, wage profiles, migration, and consumption. We have 
identified how the outcomes of mainstream theoretical models hinge on key behavioural 
parameters that could in principle be identified from the empirical analysis of happiness data. 
Some examples of these parameters include: 
 
i. The degree of risk-aversion and the complementarity between own income and 
reference income, which are important for the savings literature; 
ii. The malleability of reference groups, which is key to migration decisions and 
education decisions; 
iii. The kink in utility functions around the reference position, which is important for 
wage policies and career decisions; and, 
iv. The existence and extent of material and non-material status races, which are 
paramount for optimal taxation policy. 
 
The interaction between economic theory and happiness is therefore the next milestone for 
the developing economics of happiness literature. However, it is clear that the empirical 
literature on happiness still faces several challenges, many of which are shared with other 
empirical literatures. Two of the key challenges are to deal with a general inability of survey 
data to precisely time changes in income with changes in happiness over long time periods, and 
the difficulty in mapping incomes into current and expected consumption. It is also the case that 
most datasets do not contain reliable (if any) ex ante information regarding the group (the 
reference point) to which individuals compare themselves. Similarly, no dataset can contain all 
the variables of importance, so that researchers will continue to face the issue of endogeneity 
with respect to income and other variables such as marriage, education, and the reference group. 
Finally, natural experiments producing exogenous variation in income are only rarely observed, 
making the issue of establishing the causal effect of income on happiness a major challenge.  
Our final conclusion is that taking relative income seriously is an important step towards 
greater behavioural realism in Economics, such that our models and empirical analysis move 
closer to how real people feel and behave. Some may not like the insertion of additional 
arguments into individual utility, and remark that any behaviour can be rationalised by an 
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appropriate manipulation of the utility function. While this is formally true, it does not applies 
wholesale to the issue of relative income. As we have tried to demonstrate, utility functions 
including relative income terms produce a wide variety of testable predictions regarding both 
well-being (measured by survey or neurologically) and observable behaviours: it is not true that 
“anything goes”. To our mind, this is precisely why we need to appeal to both direct measures of 
utility and observed behaviour in order to obtain a better idea of what the utility function looks 
like, and make policy recommendations in the best interest of society. Testing these predictions 
not only allies theory and empirical analysis in economics, it also spills across many disciplines 
in the social and natural sciences; it is arguably the most important and the most promising of 
the research avenues open to this thriving literature. 
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